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Preface 
he Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), as one of the EU’s most important think-
tanks, has once again created a stimulating environment for debating different views, 
during four full-day meetings on the New Basel Capital Accord proposals. The proposals 
focus on the adoption of more risk-sensitive supervision and the possibility for banks, 
depending on their levels of sophistication, to use their own risk-management practices in 
meeting regulatory requirements (subject to certain strict conditions). This constitutes a 
fundamental change in the approach to bank regulation, but continues a trend that started with 
the treatment of market risk in 1996. Consultations with a wide range of interested parties made 
the proposals an ongoing public process from its first announcement in early 1999. 
The CEPS Task Force commenced its lively discussions in March 2002 with the participation of 
a variety of representatives from the banking, securities and insurance industry, as well as 
academics and interested individuals with a similar background. Many excellent speakers – 
mainly from Europe, but also a high-quality contingent from the US – provided much-needed 
insight and perspective. At the outset, the intention was to concentrate on issues that were of 
special importance to the European Union, but most of the Basel Accord issues turned out to 
have European dimensions, particularly as the EU will be the widest area of implementation, 
covering all banks (as well as investment firms authorised under the investment services 
Directive) and not just internationally active ones. Discussions therefore often focussed on 
competitive issues for European financial-sector firms. 
As the Basel Committee’s proposals were amended over time, it is understandable that the focus 
of the debates of the Task Force regularly changed and topics kept re-emerging in different 
ways, as new proposals overtook the various discussions or issues were accommodated in later 
versions of the proposals. This made the process more stimulating for Task Force participants, 
but it exacerbated the already difficult task of the rapporteurs, Rym Ayadi and Professor Andrea 
Resti. While the discussions continued over the two years since the Task Force was established, 
the rapporteurs were shooting at a moving target.  
As the process is coming to an end with the likely finalisation of Basel II in June of this year, it 
can be concluded that the Task Force, in large measures, supported the new Basel framework as 
it has had a good understanding of the new risk-measurement and management techniques. The 
report urges the EU to agree on the European capital adequacy Directive implementing the 
Basel II proposals (dubbed ‘CAD III’) as quickly as possible. 
Discussions by the Task Force concentrated more on a number of relatively thorny issues, such 
as procyclicality, complexity, small- and medium-sized enterprises and operational-risk 
calculations, which had created considerable excitement early in the process, but now have 
become more mainstream in our thinking.  
In this report, the two rapporteurs succeed in describing these complex issues and bringing 
forward general positions of the Task Force on these key issues. For understandable and 
customary reasons, no positions of individual members, nor majority/minority views, could be 
mentioned by name.  
 
 
Frederik C. Musch 
Chairman 
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THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
RYM AYADI & ANDREA RESTI, RAPPORTEURS 
Executive Summary & Policy Recommendations 
n adopting the Basel Capital Accord in 1988, the major aim of the Committee on Banking 
Supervision was to ensure that internationally active banks provide a stronger capital 
cushion against insolvency. Many market developments since then, however, have brought 
the inadequacies of the 1988 Accord to light. Indeed, banks had already started to use more 
sophisticated techniques to manage their credit risk, which allowed them to safely reduce the 
amount of capital needed. At the same time, there was an explosion in the use of instruments for 
credit-risk transfer, including securitisation and credit derivatives, which have allowed banks to 
trade their credit-risk exposures. The existence of a considerable gap between supervisory 
requirements and risk-based measures of economic capital at the end of the 1990s led to forms 
of regulatory arbitrage. Furthermore, the inability of the 1988 Accord to differentiate between 
investment-grade and junk borrowers might have also made some financial institutions more 
risk-prone instead of helping them to control their risks. A revision of the 1988 Accord was thus 
urgently needed, after a first step was taken in 1995 with the amendment to the treatment of 
market risk. 
In 1999, the Basel Committee issued a proposal for a new capital adequacy framework based on 
three mutually reinforcing pillars: minimum capital requirements, supervisory review and 
market discipline. This proposal took into account the new risk-management techniques and 
sought to fill the gap between economic and regulatory capital. To make the New Basel Capital 
Accord robust in its structure and parameters, the Basel Committee engaged in an active 
dialogue with bankers, national regulators, experts, academics and other market participants to 
work together to complete the final Basel regulatory framework for approval and international 
implementation by the end of 2006.  
In Europe, important changes in the regulatory framework were mainly related to the ongoing 
Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP). Being part of the various initiatives taken in the FSAP, 
the Basel II Accord will be implemented at EU level as a single directive that will amend 
2000/12/EC and the capital adequacy Directive, and is referred to as ‘CAD III’.  
CEPS chose to contribute to the ongoing debate by organising a Task Force on the New Basel 
Capital Accord and the future of the European financial system. The conclusions of the Task 
Force are summarised below. 
1.  The Basel II process 
Regulators need to come to a final agreement on the new Accord and should not let uncertainty 
linger. The new capital adequacy framework suits the needs of European banks and investment 
firms as it improves the alignment of regulatory capital to the underlying risk they face, and thus 
reduces the incentives and the scope of capital regulatory arbitrage. A more risk-sensitive 
regulatory framework is beneficial to ensure a safe and sound banking system, provided that 
complexity and sophistication can be kept under control.  
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A balanced focus between the three pillars of the new capital adequacy framework is needed. 
Since the beginning of the revision process to the New Basel Capital Accord, a tremendous 
effort has been devoted to the first pillar, since it contains precise, quantitative rules for 
computing the new minimum capital requirements, but much less focus was dedicated to the 
second and third pillars. Clarity of rules under the first pillar may, however, be undermined by 
the discretionary behaviour of regulators under the second pillar and the ineffectiveness of the 
third pillar. We strongly support clear-cut principles to define the relationship between banks 
and supervisors, and a stronger and more credible form of market discipline. This will be a 
major implementation challenge. 
A consistent cross-border application of the new Accord is the key to preserving the level 
playing field. Home and host-country supervisory authorities need to cooperate closely to ensure 
the consistent application of the new Basel framework. In this matter, the Basel Accord 
Implementation Group (AIG) should play a key role, although its principles leave too much 
room for the host country. This cooperation must be also extended to other financial authorities 
and standard-setters, including the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the 
International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), to ensure the convergence of the new 
Basel rules with the new international accounting standards and with the new solvency rules for 
insurance. The use of national discretion should be handled restrictively so as to minimise the 
problem of competitive distortions and reduce the costs of complexity. 
An adequate calibration of the new capital adequacy framework needs to be ensured. Extensive 
analysis revealed some limitations of the third quantitative impact study (QIS-3) results, 
suggesting caution with interpretations. Consequently, there is a need to improve these results, 
particularly after the endorsement of the new treatment of expected and unexpected credit losses 
in the internal ratings-based approach, in order to assess the real impact of the new capital rules 
on the European banking system. We encourage field tests to ensure that the Accord is correctly 
calibrated on a continuous basis.  
2.  The EU CAD III process 
The EU has a showpiece role in the implementation of the new Accord. The EU will be the first 
‘critical mass’ of countries to implement the Accord and will thus have to make sure that it 
works. At the same time, the EU should not act in isolation given the global nature of the 
Accord and the financial industry. With the creation of the new regulatory and supervisory 
Committees, the structure is in place to allow for a consistent and harmonious implementation 
of the Accord across countries, and to accommodate any required changes quickly. Yet the work 
will be complex and demanding, and some issues will need to be resolved in a European spirit, 
such as home and host-country cooperation, the consolidation of capital and the supervisory 
discretion under the second pillar. The medium-term ambition should be a single European 
banking rule book.  
Fair competition should be preserved between those banks that are internationally active and 
small- and medium-sized European banks (SMBs). The survival of SMBs as independent 
entities could be somewhat endangered by the fact that the implementation costs of the new 
rules are often fixed and can be more easily absorbed by larger institutions (although large, 
diversified international groups may incur higher validation costs having to satisfy multiple 
jurisdictions). To keep compliance costs reasonably low, SMBs are likely to adopt the 
standardised approach (as anticipated by the results from the European Commission’s third 
quantitative impact study), and to suffer from a potential adverse-selection effect by orienting 
their exposures towards a high-risk borrowers’ profile; however, this approach could be adopted 
only as a transitory method while preparing the ground for more sophisticated risk-management BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | iii 
 
tools. In fact, to avoid adverse-selection effects, SMBs should be stimulated and helped to 
develop and implement modern and efficient risk-management systems.  
An adequate and fair treatment of the small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) portfolio 
needs to be ensured in Europe. The favourable treatment of the SME portfolio under the new 
regulatory rules was theoretically defendable since SMEs were shown to have a lower default 
correlation than larger companies. Empirically, research has yielded mixed findings, implying 
the likely unfair treatment of larger enterprises. We call for more empirical research on this 
issue to ensure the empirical validity of the underlying assumption behind the Basel 
Committee’s decision for Europe.  
The awareness of European SMEs about the new financing conditions needs to be increased. 
The new regulatory rules will certainly impact the credit conditions for SMEs but not 
necessarily by leading to a reduction of the credit supply available to these entities. The more 
risk-sensitive pricing introduced by these rules will entail a certain variability of capital 
adequacy, depending on the individual quality of the borrower. Adopting one of the internal 
ratings-based (IRB) approaches entails relying on a set of quantitative and qualitative 
information to be provided by European SMEs and other client groups. This information is the 
key to running the internal rating systems properly. Hence, it is important that companies 
understand and adjust to the new rating culture. For that, the cooperation and the exchange of 
information between SMEs and lenders need to be encouraged. 
The new regulatory rules should not inhibit alternative financing sources for European SMEs. 
The availability of different sources of financing for SMEs prevents banks from having a 
dominant position and could also be an adequate response to tackling information asymmetries 
along with some of the potentially adverse implications of the new capital adequacy rules. 
Among others, leasing is one of the most-used external financing sources by European SMEs 
after bank-loan financing. Yet the treatment of the leasing business under the new regulatory 
rules is somewhat penalising, although it is a relatively low-risk business. A wider recognition 
of physical collateral would not only allow a better reflection of the relatively low-risk profile of 
lease exposures but also contribute to reducing the significant gap in capital requirements 
arising from the three approaches of the proposed framework. Also, equity financing through 
private equities and venture capital could be another important potential source of financing for 
innovative SMEs. Nevertheless, the treatment of such exposures under Basel II is somewhat 
restrictive and ignores the benefits of diversification that arise from pooling various risks into a 
fund or a fund of funds.  
Adequate defences to counter procyclicality should be put in place.  Procyclicality results 
directly from the risk sensitivity of the new Accord, but volatile regulatory capital requirements 
could be detrimental to financial stability. Although it should be noted that banks themselves 
already manage the volatility in economic capital and loss, the Basel Committee has addressed 
this issue in several ways, such as the flattening of the risk weight curve and the introduction of 
requirements for bank stress-testing. Yet, the smoothing effect is only very modest if one wants 
to avoid significant distortion relative to capital charges across borrowers. Hence, efforts should 
continue to monitor the procyclical effects of the new Accord. Dynamic provisioning is one 
alternative solution to cope with this in the European context. The underlying principle is to 
build up a provision in an economic upturn that could be drawn upon in an economic downturn 
when expected losses exceed actual ones. Dynamic provisioning should lead to lower volatility 
in a bank’s profit and loss figures, thus reducing procyclicality concerns. A crucial factor in the 
success of this technique is the reliability and objectivity of the estimates of expected losses. 
  
| 1 
THE NEW BASEL CAPITAL ACCORD AND 
THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM 
REPORT OF A CEPS TASK FORCE 
RYM AYADI
* 
Introduction 
Almost five years of negotiations within the Basel Committee seem to have finally produced a 
broader and more substantive regulatory framework for internationally active banks that aims at 
underpinning banking solvency. Several delays have slowed down the process owing to the 
concerns that have been raised during the consultation period, which led to a fairly high number 
of issues to be resolved. Some of the issues have already been solved, such as the treatment of 
expected and unexpected losses and the issue of home and host country operational-risk capital. 
Other issues, such as the treatment of the trading book and credit derivatives, are still under 
revision and are unlikely to be included in the document that is to be finalised by mid-2004 for 
implementation at the end of 2006. It is even expected that this will give rise to some advanced 
versions of Basel II.  
The New Basel Capital Accord introduces an evolutionary and flexible approach to banking 
supervision, which reflects the rapid progress and sophistication of banking practices and risk-
management techniques. By aligning supervision and regulation with these techniques, the 
proposed new capital framework not only provides strong incentives for banks to continue 
improving their internal risk-management capabilities but also gives the necessary tools to 
supervisors to enable them to react to any emerging matter that occurs and thus reduces the 
regulatory arbitrage opportunities that the existing rules create.  
Indeed, Basel II contains a number of new aspects to the regulation and supervision of banks 
structured around three pillars: minimum capital requirement, supervisory review and market 
discipline. The main novelties in the first pillar are the variety of approaches it includes, such as 
the introduction of a more risk-sensitive framework based on sophisticated risk-management 
techniques and a new capital requirement for operational risk. The second pillar requires 
supervisors to ensure that each bank has sound internal processes in place to adequately assess 
their risks. Finally, the third pillar aims at reinforcing market discipline through enhanced 
disclosure by banks.  
Although the focus of the new Basel Accord framework is primarily on internationally active 
banks, the variety of approaches offered under the first pillar are intended to be suitable for 
application to banks of varying levels of complexity and sophistication. The risk weights will be 
refined by reference to a rating that is provided by either an external credit assessment 
institution under the standardised approach, or produced internally by a bank risk-management 
system under the internal ratings-based approaches. Calculating the right risk weights under the 
most advanced approaches will not only depend on developing a sufficient awareness and 
expertise in risk evaluation for those banks that have not been able to use the most sophisticated 
risk-management tools so far, but also on the inability of other banks to manipulate their 
internal ratings systems in a manner that underestimates their credit risks. For the first kind of 
banks, the costs associated only with regulatory compliance are difficult to estimate and to 
                                                      
* Rym Ayadi is a Research Fellow at CEPS. She thanks Andrea Resti, Karel Lannoo, Bernhard Speyer, 
Jos Wieleman and Javier Echarri for their helpful remarks and suggestions on an earlier draft. 2 | RYM AYADI 
 
dissociate from those costs that are inherent to upgrading their internal risk-management 
systems. For the latter banks, it is very likely that the development of more sophisticated risk-
management tools will lead to increasing complexity for the monitoring of these institutions.  
Under the proposed new Accord, most of the burden of controlling banks’ internal risk-
assessment is placed under the second pillar. Supervisory authorities are certainly facing an 
important challenge to efficiently monitor different kinds of banking institutions. They are 
expected to build a substantial quantitative and qualitative expertise and to work closely with 
banks. Finally, market discipline has to be viewed as an important mechanism to induce banks 
to hold sufficient capital in relation to the risk taken. Effective market discipline requires not 
only that relevant information is available to investors but also that is possible to use this 
information to discipline a bank that releases negative information or abstains from releasing 
positive information.  
At the European level, the Basel framework offered a substantial background to revise the EU 
Directive on capital adequacy. As the EU process is moving in parallel with the Basel process, it 
is facing the difficulties inherent to the finalisation of the Accord itself and the problems of 
ensuring that the new directive meets European needs. The European implementation of the new 
Basel Accord has become an important issue, where European specificities have to be taken into 
account. All European banks and investment firms with varying levels of sophistication fall 
under the new banking regulation, which will be transposed into European law. Under this 
scope of application, the European approach to implementing the new Accord is challenging. 
Indeed, besides the main objective of requiring all banks to maintain adequate levels of capital 
to safeguard the stability of the overall financial system, it requires a large amount of flexibility, 
as it should fit small-, medium-sized and large banks as well as investment firms. Moreover, it 
should consider very closely the ‘level playing field’ principle as European banks need to be 
subject to equivalent regulations whether they are small-, medium-sized or large banks, non-
banks, specialised or diversified banks. And finally, it should promote convergence to reach the 
objective of creating a single European financial market. The reconciliation of these objectives 
is crucial to promote financial stability and long-term economic growth. Some actions have 
been already taken to prepare the ground for the successful implementation of the New Basel 
Capital Accord. The creation of the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS) is 
intended not only to enhance the cooperation between national supervisors, but also to help 
incorporate technical changes more easily.  
For the time being, it is difficult to make an exhaustive evaluation of the new capital adequacy 
Directive. But at first glance, a more risk-sensitive calibration and a more obvious linkage 
between banks’ own risk-management and mitigation techniques and regulatory capital 
requirements may give a natural incentive to banks to implement the most sophisticated tools to 
manage their risks. Nevertheless, it is important to proceed with a cost-benefit analysis, 
particularly for small- and medium-sized banks that may or may not have the necessary 
resources to implement such onerous tools. Moreover, if these costs are passed on to consumers 
and SMEs, their financing conditions may deteriorate and in turn hinder their growth. Finally, 
being more risk-sensitive, the new rules may exacerbate the cycle in a downturn when banks opt 
for a restrictive loan policy.  
By addressing these issues, the purpose of this report is to provide a detailed, up-to-date and 
critical analysis of the New Basel Capital Accord framework. It also focuses on the limitations 
and pitfalls that may deserve further investigation, particularly at the European level. Moreover, 
it provides a provisional assessment of its effects on small- and medium-sized European banks, 
as well as small- and medium-sized European enterprises. Moreover, it examines the 
procyclicality of the new Accord and offers mechanisms to counter it. Finally, it addresses the 
challenges of implementing the new rules at the EU level.  
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Chapter 1 
The Architecture of the New Basel Capital Accord 
From Basel I to Basel II 
Andrea Resti* 
1.1  From Basel I to Basel II 
During the last fifteen years, the 1988 Capital Accord dealing with minimum capital 
requirements for internationally active financial institutions has grown more and more 
pervasive, and has been integrated into the national regulations of most advanced countries. 
Meanwhile, the limitations and drawbacks of the simple rules on which it is based have become 
increasingly apparent: namely, the existence of a considerable gap between supervisory 
requirements and risk-based measures of economic capital, which has led to forms of regulatory 
arbitrage (whereby loopholes in the regulation have been exploited to increase the real leverage 
of a bank without reducing its capital ratios). Paradoxically, the inability of the 1988 protocol to 
discriminate between investment-grade and junk borrowers might also have made some 
financial institutions more likely to take risks, instead of helping them to control their risks. 
To address such challenges, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been engaged for 
several years in a revision process that will finally lead to a New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA). 
Remarkably, the contents of the new Accord have been thoroughly discussed among national 
supervisors, banks, academics. Thus, the drafting of NBCA has become a meeting point for 
many different perspectives: legal experts, accountants, bank managers, central bankers and 
finance scholars have been working together, merging their professional backgrounds to make 
the NBCA more robust in its structure and parameters. 
1.2  Overall structure of the NBCA 
According to the current draft of the NBCA,
1 bank supervision will be based on three 
components (the three pillars of the Accord): minimum capital requirements, supervisory 
review (section 1.7) and market discipline (section 1.8).  
Although all of them are equally meaningful in supervisors’ eyes, most comments and 
criticisms have focused on the first pillar, since it contains some precise quantitative rules for 
computing the new minimum capital requirements, and any change in such rules is likely to 
have a deep impact on bank leverage, profitability and the price of bank credit for non-financial 
companies. 
The computation of the minimum supervisory capital under the first pillar will be based on the 
sum of the capital requirements originating from: 1) credit risk, 2) market risk, and 3) 
operational risk. Although no major change is being added to the computation of market risk 
capital, the New Basel Capital Accord profoundly redefines the mechanisms for the 
                                                      
* Andrea Resti is at the University of Bergamo. He is especially thankful to Ole Bus Henriksen, Bernhard 
Speyer and Peter Konesny for their valuable suggestions on a previous draft. Useful additions from Victor 
Dowd on operational risks are gratefully acknowledged. 
1 All references to the NBCA in this report are based on the third consultative paper issued in April 2003 
(Basel Committee, 2003a). 4 | RYM AYADI 
 
computation of credit risk, while it also introduces a set of minimum capital requirements 
against operational risk (which has hitherto been unknown to risk-capital regulation).  
Operational-risk capital will be briefly covered in section 1.5. The following paragraphs 
instead focus on credit-risk capital. In this area, the NBCA marks a break with the past, 
since loans issued to similar counterparts (e.g. private firms or sovereigns) will require 
different capital coverage depending on the level of intrinsic risk, as evaluated by some 
external ratings institutions (standardised approach) or by the bank itself (internal ratings-
based or IRB approach).  
1.3  First pillar: Standardised approach 
In the standardised approach, the amount of capital required on an unsecured €1 loan to a 
private firm – now fixed at 8 cents (8% x €1) – could decrease to 1.6 or increase to 12 cents, 
based on the ratings issued by the so-called ‘external credit assessment institutions’ (ECAI). 
These can be rating agencies, as well as other evaluators accepted by national supervisors 
(e.g. export credit agencies). Yet to comply with Basel II, rating providers will have to 
satisfy a set of minimum prerequisites (mainly concerning the transparency and consistency 
of their rating criteria). A bank will be allowed to use the ratings of more than one ECAI, 
but some precise rules will prevent any opportunistic (‘cherry-picking’) behaviour. Thus, 
banks will not be allowed to choose, for each customer, the rating source assigning the most 
favourable judgement (thereby reducing the total amount of regulatory capital). 
Better ratings will bring about lower weights in the computation of risk-weighted assets; 
moreover, as in Basel I, different categories of counterparties (e.g. non-financial firms, 
states or banks) will receive different sets of coefficients. This is summarised in Table 1.1, 
where ratings by Standard and Poor’s are used as a sample scale.  
Although the table may look complex at first glance, its meaning is quite intuitive: rows 
indicate the different classes of borrowers identified by Basel II (corporates, sovereign 
entities, banks, small firms and individuals labelled as ‘retail’) plus some specific facilities. 
Columns report the various ratings that can be assigned to a counterparty. Combining rows 
and columns one sees that, for example, a €100 loan to a AAA-rated non-financial company 
will translate into €20 of risk-weighted assets, and will therefore lead to a capital 
requirement of 20 x 8% = €1.6 (in other words, 1.6% of the unweighted exposure). 
Similarly, a €100 facility offered to a sovereign state with a rating lower than B- will give 
rise to a €150 risk-weighted exposure, hence requiring a capital coverage of 150 x 8% = €12 
(12% of the face value). 
The last two columns need some brief clarifications. First, unrated exposures (where no 
ECAI-issued rating is available) will usually be weighted at 100% (as in the present 
Accord); note that this is likely to apply to most European non-financial firms (although 
some of them will have access to better treatment if included in the retail portfolio, as 
explained below). Second, past-due loans (where a delay of more than 90 days has occurred 
on any payment) will usually be weighted at 150% (like the worst-rated classes), as 
payment delays could signal that the borrower is experiencing solvency problems. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1.1 Risk weights in the standardised approach 
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Some rows in the table also deserve a few quick comments. First, two alternative treatments are 
available for bank exposures: in fact, these can be ranked according to either their own 
individual ratings or the ratings issued to the countries where the banks have their legal 
headquarters.
1 According to the latter option, all banks incorporated in the same country will be 
assigned the same risk weight (e.g. 20% if they are based in a country with a rating of at least 
AA-). Secondly, retail exposures (i.e. exposures smaller that €1 million issued to individuals 
and small firms) will form a separate portfolio, including rotating exposures such as credit cards 
and overdrafts, instalment loans and leasing (provided that no single borrower accounts for 
more than 0.2% of the retail portfolio itself). Retail exposures will almost certainly be unrated; 
however, since they are highly granular and therefore help diversify credit risks, they will be 
granted a reduced risk weight of 75% (a €100 loan hence becomes a €75 risk-weighted asset). 
Finally, as in the present Accord, residential mortgage loans will be given a lower risk weight 
(but the current coefficient of 50% will be cut further, to 35%); moreover, national supervisors 
will also be allowed to assign a reduced risk weight (although no lower than 50%) to loans 
secured by commercial real estate, provided that the value of such collateral is subject to a 
limited market risk.  
In addition to residential and commercial real estate, other types of collateral are acceptable in 
the standardised approach. Two approaches are possible, in increasing order of complexity: the 
so-called ‘simple approach’ applies to a wide range of financial collaterals (cash, gold, debt 
securities, some qualified shares and mutual funds investing in the above-mentioned 
instruments), while the ‘comprehensive approach’ also holds for all listed shares. In the simple 
approach, the portion of the exposure covered by recognised collateral receives the risk weight 
applicable to the collateral itself, not to the original borrower (subject to a floor, usually, of 
20%). In the comprehensive approach, no capital requirement is applied to the collateralised 
portion of the exposure, but the value of the collateral must be reduced by a haircut, reflecting 
the risk that the market value of the financial instrument pledged by the borrower may decrease 
before it is revaluated or remargined (haircuts tend to be different based on the historical 
volatility of the securities pledged as collateral, and are scaled up as the number of days 
between remargining or revaluation dates increases).  
To mitigate risks, personal guarantees and credit derivatives are also acceptable, provided that 
they are issued by states and other public sector entities, banks and other regulated financial 
firms, or non-financial companies with a rating of at least A-. When such guarantees are present, 
the risk coefficient of the borrower is replaced by that of the guarantor, usually leading to a 
lower risk-weighted asset. 
1.4  First pillar: Internal ratings-based approach 
If a bank chooses (and is allowed) to create its own rating system (instead of depending on 
external agencies), the capital against each credit exposure will be a function of five basic 
parameters: 
1.  the PD (probability of default) of the borrower; 
2.  the expected loss rate in case of default (LGD, loss-given default); 
3.  the exposure at default (EAD), which may differ from the current exposure, for example if 
committed undrawn margins are present; 
 
                                                      
1 National supervisors will opt for one of the two treatments and this choice will apply to all regulated 
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4.  the maturity (m) of the loan, which increases the possibility that the original probability of 
default be revised and possibly increased; and 
5.  the degree of diversification and correlation (rho) of the credit portfolio to which the 
exposure belongs. 
In the simplified, or ‘foundation’ IRB approach, banks are responsible only for measuring (in a 
transparent and reliable way) the probability of default of their borrowers, while the other four 
components are set by the supervisors. In the ‘advanced’ approach to internal ratings, on the 
other hand, banks are required to estimate all risk profiles (except the degree of correlation), but 
will have to convince supervisors that such estimates are based on a wide empirical dataset, and 
are consistent with their own loss experience over the previous years. Note that the degree of 
correlation of the overall credit portfolio is always set by supervisors. Table 2 shows more 
details on the estimation/computation of the above-mentioned risk factors. 
The risk parameters of each loan (PD, LGD, EAD, maturity and correlation) are turned into a 
capital requirement by means of a formula based on a simple credit-risk model.
2 Capital ratios 
increase linearly with LGD and EAD, and less than linearly (although quite steeply) with 
default probability.
3 The bank’s final capital target is then computed simply as the sum of all 
individual requirements: this means that ‘sub-additive’ portfolio models,
4 like credit VaRs, are 
not admitted; however, the correlation parameters fixed by the Basel Committee (see Table 1.2) 
take lower values for portfolios made up of small- and medium-sized enterprises or individuals, 
accounting for the fact that a higher granularity of the exposures helps diversify total risks. 
Unfortunately, these correlation values are the same for all banks and do not reflect the 
individual characteristics of each bank’s loan portfolio (e.g. the fact that it may be highly 
concentrated in a limited number of countries or industries or both). Such bank-specific 
concentration risks will therefore have to be addressed by national supervisors, under the second 
pillar of the Accord.  
                                                      
2 An extensive presentation of the regulatory formulae for capital computation can be found in a previous 
CEPS report (see Resti, 2002). 
3 Note that the Basel Committee is still revising the formulae for the computation of capital requirements. 
Namely, the Committee has recently decided (Basel Committee, 2003d) that only unexpected losses will 
have to be covered through capital, while expected losses will be faced by means of general or specific 
provisions. This marks a clear break with the Committee’s original position and addresses the objections 
raised by many research bodies (see Resti, 2002) and practitioners.  
4 A risk measure is said to be ‘sub-additive’ if the total risk (therefore also the total capital requirement) 
of a pooled loan portfolio is less than the sum of the risks (and capital requirements) of the individual 
loans. Note that since different loans tend to be imperfectly correlated, thereby allowing for some risk 
diversification, sensible risk measures always tend to be sub-additive.  
 
Table 1.2 Risk factors included in the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach 
Factor  Meaning  Computation in the foundation approach  Computation in the advanced approach 
PD Probability  that 
the borrower is 
unwilling or 
unable to pay  
The PD must be computed over a one-year risk horizon, accounting for possible deteriorations in the borrower’s creditworthiness in the medium 
to long term. 
LGD  Loss rate in the 
event of default 
The LGD is fixed at 45% for all senior, unsecured exposures. This value 
must be raised to 75% for subordinated exposures, but can be adjusted 
downwards when some recognised collateral is pledged against the loan.  
When the collateral is an eligible financial instrument, the LGD can be 
reduced down to 0%, based on the value of the collateral and on a system 
of regulatory haircuts. Three types of non-financial collateral are also 
accepted: receivables, real estate (commercial and residential) and other 
collateral (including physical capital, but excluding any assets acquired 
by the bank as a result of a loan default). These non-financial collaterals 
may drive the LGD down to 40% (35% for receivables and real estate).  
Banks will be allowed to use their own estimates of LGDs, 
provided that they can persuade supervisors that their models are 
conceptually sound and consistent with their past experience. LGDs 
will have to be assessed in an economic sense rather than from a 
mere accounting perspective: when measuring recovery rates, all 
relevant factors that may reduce the final economic value of the 
recovered part of the exposure must be taken into account. This 
includes the discount effect associated with the time elapsed 
between the emergence of the default and the actual recovery, but 
also the various direct and indirect administrative costs associated 
with collecting on the exposure. 
EAD Exposure  at 
default 
EAD is computed at 100% of current exposure, plus 75% of undrawn 
irrevocable commitments. Off-balance sheet exposures will have to be 
converted into credit equivalents by means of standard credit-conversion 
factors. 
Banks will be allowed to use their own estimates of EAD, provided 
that they can persuade supervisors that their models are 
conceptually sound and consistent with their past experience. 
Maturity Time  to  maturity 
of the loan 
Maturity is conventionally set at two and a half years.  Maturity must be computed as a zero-rate financial duration and 
will be capped at five years. Maturities shorter than one year will 
be allowed only in very specific cases.  
Correlation Correlation 
between the 
changes in the 
value of the assets 
of any two 
borrowers in the 
loan portfolio 
A rather high correlation (24%) is used for loans to highly-rated, large non-financial firms (the so-called ‘corporate’ portfolio); this is owing to 
the fact that such companies are supposed to fail mainly because of systemic shocks (that tend to hit all obligors at the same time). The 
correlation grows lower (from 24% to 12%) as the borrower’s rating worsens: in this case, in fact, idiosyncratic factors are thought to be the 
main driver behind default risk. 
The two extreme values seen above (24% and 12%) are scaled down, towards 20% and 8% respectively, when the borrower’s turnover is less 
than €50 million. This is because small firms, too, are supposed to be affected mainly by idiosyncratic risks. 
Correlations grow even thinner (17% for highly-rated borrowers and 2% for low-rating counterparties) in the case of loans to individuals and 
small firms included in the ‘retail’ portfolio. For the so-called ‘qualifying revolving-retail exposures’ (mainly credit cards and overdrafts issued 
at a very high interest rate), the correlation coefficients for high and low-quality borrowers range from 11% to 2%. Finally, a fixed correlation 
of 15% is used in the case of residential mortgages. 
8
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1.5  First pillar: Operational risk  
The new capital requirements will not be limited to credit risk (as in the 1988 Accord): a 
considerable amount of capital will have to be held against operational risk (i.e. the risk that 
flaws in a bank’s own systems or human resources, as well as external events, may cause 
unexpected losses, such as those related to mass litigation, fraud or natural catastrophes). This 
section briefly reviews the main concepts introduced by the NBCA. 
A uniform risk-measurement scheme for such a wide-ranging class of risks as operational risks 
could not be easily designed. As in the case of credit risk, the Basel Committee had to adopt an 
‘evolutionary’ approach, indicating three different methodologies, ranging from the simplest to 
the most complex. 
Under the first approach (‘basic-indicator approach’) banks are required to hold a capital 
cushion against operational risks equal to 15% of their total gross income (measured as a three-
year moving average); this just reflects the fact that larger banks are subject to a higher amount 
of risk. This methodology can be easily implemented, but looks very simplistic and lends itself 
to much criticism. On one hand, it does not account for the fact that some business areas in a 
bank are more prone to operational risk than other ones (e.g. securities-trading involves high 
margins of uncertainty relating to possible human errors, to frauds and to the risk of a computer 
crash, while the traditional deposit-raising business is based on simpler, slower, more reliable 
procedures). On the other hand, this approach does not, by any means, ‘reward’ banks that 
engage in better (hence, more expensive) risk-control procedures. 
To address the first critique, the NBCA includes a second approach, the so-called ‘standardised 
approach’ (note that this is not, in any way, related to the standardised approach to credit risk). 
Under this methodology, the banks’ gross income is split among eight business lines: corporate 
finance, trading and sales, payment and settlement, commercial banking, agency services, retail 
banking, asset management and retail brokerage. For the first three lines, which are supposed to 
be more exposed to operational risks, the 15% coefficient is raised to 18%; symmetrically, it is 
lowered to 12% for the last three, which are thought to be less risky.  
Although an adjustment to the coefficients may appear to address the problems connected with 
the basic indicator approach, it is neither a complete nor fully satisfactory solution. Actually, for 
a bank to adopt the standardised approach, it must comply with a strict set of entry criteria: this 
means a bank will have to make significant investments without receiving any expected a priori 
benefit (and in the case of intermediaries specialising in the business lines of corporate finance, 
trading and sales or payment and settlement, the bank must make an extra investment to receive 
a higher capital charge). 
The second objection is addressed by the so-called ‘advanced approach’. While the structure of 
the advanced approach to credit-risk measurement is clearly defined by the Committee (see 
Table 2 above), in the case of operational risk the parameters and the criteria for the ‘advanced’ 
computation of regulatory capital are not explicitly stated by the regulators. Rather, a list of 
requisites is provided, which banks will have to satisfy if their systems are to be validated for 
capital adequacy purposes. Thus a qualifying advanced approach must deal with a minimum set 
of operational loss types, must measure each risk factor in a reasonably detailed way, must 
estimate capital in such a way that both expected and unexpected losses are covered, and must 
be based on a wide empirical database and on sound analytic processes.  
Two objectives drive the choice of the Committee to avoid specifying a well-structured 
measurement scheme, but simply indicate some minimum requirements instead. First, the 
NBCA accepts the fact that the current state of the art of operational risk measurement models is 
rapidly evolving; therefore, it should not be ‘frozen’ into a regulatory scheme that would soon 
become outdated. Second, the ‘open architecture’ of the advanced approach should work as an 10 | ANDREA RESTI 
 
incentive for banks to invest in new operational risk management tools, without being bound by 
some specific model. 
The unparalleled flexibility offered by the Committee, however, is not without problems. Being 
granted such flexibility, banks are allowed to model operational risk in the manner most 
appropriate to their own internal needs, i.e. a bank can develop an enterprise-wide operational 
risk model. Yet a bank’s business structure may not dovetail exactly with the Basel business 
lines or may transcend regulatory jurisdictions or both. As a result, a number of significant 
concerns may emerge, namely: i) how to deal with banking operations located in multiple 
jurisdictions; ii) how operational-risk mitigation should be addressed; and iii) what is the most 
appropriate treatment of institutions that are not banks (such as fund managers). 
i)  For banks operating in multiple jurisdictions, under the proposed Basel II rules each 
jurisdiction is able to apply its own rules through the use of national discretion. If the home 
regulator and each host supervisory body were to apply a set of national rules, then an 
internationally active bank would be unable to develop and implement an enterprise-wide 
model for operational risk.  
For a large, internationally-active and diversified institution, the request to estimate and 
possibly hold capital at the subsidiary level would effectively
 negate the inherent attributes 
associated with being large, internationally-active and diverse, resulting in a higher capital 
charge. Further, efforts to develop, validate and seek approval for an advanced measurement 
approach (AMA) in each jurisdiction would be problematic given the dearth of available 
data. 
If they choose to develop a series of local models reflecting local regulatory needs, 
internationally active banks would be required to calculate and hold capital at each 
subsidiary level. This is inconsistent with the principles of the revised Basel accord, which 
requires capital to be determined at the holding company level.
1 
ii)  Let us now turn to the rules surrounding capital mitigation. First and most importantly, 
mitigation of the proposed capital charge is only possible if the risk-mitigant (i.e. the 
insurance policy) and exposure are mapped into each other. Secondly, relief through 
insurance policies is currently capped at 20% of the operational-risk capital charge and no 
explicit review of this cap is mentioned.
2 
Moreover, many large credit institutions today manage risks through the procurement of 
insurance from captives and affiliates. Under the proposed operational-risk mitigation rules, 
                                                      
1 Consideration of the home-host issue also impinges upon capital relief through mitigation. At an 
aggregate level, capital relief is limited to 20% of the operational-risk capital charge. It may be possible, 
however, that the bank’s internal capital-allocation mechanism mitigates the capital charge for some areas 
of the business by more than 20% and less than 20% in others. On a consolidated basis, this would not be 
significant as the aggregate relief would still be 20%. Nevertheless, where capital and capital relief has 
had to be determined at the subsidiary level the results would be different. The difference would occur 
when those entities attracting a capital relief greater than 20% would be capped at 20%. On an aggregated 
basis, this ‘surplus’ relief would be lost to the system rather than transferred internally.  
2 Capital relief through insurance is also dependent on the residual time of the insurance contract, with a 
haircut being applied to those contracts with a duration of less than one year. The underlying assumption 
is that insurance contracts are not renewed, whereas it can be shown that in the majority of contracts this 
is not the case. In addition, the criterion fails to take into account the historic track record of insurance 
policies. It also detaches capital relief from good operational-risk management, as the availability of 
multi-year insurance policies is a function of the cyclical nature of the insurance market.  BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 11 
 
such institutions will not gain recognition for this risk mitigation, even though the judicial 
use of a captive will give the financial institution access to the re-insurance market. 
iii) The fact that Basel has limited capital mitigation to institutions operating under an AMA 
regime could have a significant impact on the fund-management industry. The predominant 
risk faced by fund managers is operational risk, as fund mangers have a very limited 
exposure to market or credit risk. Yet many small- and medium-sized fund management 
firms appear unlikely to apply for AMA-model approval; this means that fund managers 
will be disadvantaged, which does raise questions about a level playing field. One solution 
to this potential problem would be for the European Union to deviate from Basel and allow 
small- and medium-sized fund managers to use insurance either as a replacement for capital 
or as a capital mitigant under the less-advanced approaches.
3  
Finally, one has to keep in mind that the capital charge against operational risks represents a 
new requirement, above and beyond credit-risk capital. Hence, even if under the NBCA a highly 
rated loan is likely to command a lower capital charge than the former 8%, the total capital 
requirement may be higher than in the current Accord, because of the operational-risk 
component. 
1.6  Expected and unexpected losses 
By introducing a new standardised approach, as well as rules on internal ratings and operational 
risks, the NBCA was intended to refine the way risks were measured (and covered) inside 
banks, without altering the definition of regulatory capital. In other words, the Accord was 
meant to alter the formula for computing risk-weighted assets (the denominator in the so-called 
‘8% formula’), while capital (the numerator) should have remained unchanged.  
Nevertheless, the Accord’s discussion drafts chose to cover all possible losses up to a given 
confidence level (e.g. up to 99.9% of all possible cases); this meant that bank capital was used 
to shield both expected losses (ELs) and unexpected losses (ULs) (see Figure 1.1). The 
regulatory capital to be held against such losses still followed the definition stated in the 1988 
Accord, including both shareholders’ capital and reserves.  
This choice was far from being conceptually correct. As ELs represent the mean of the 
distribution of future losses, they should be dealt with as a cost, not as a risk: this means that 
they should ultimately be charged against the current profit and loss account, and held aside as a 
reserve fund until they are actually incurred.  
Unexpected losses, on the other hand, may not materialise for many years, so it would be 
unnecessarily conservative to treat them as a cost that must be fully covered by a bank’s lending 
rates; to hedge them, banks just have to ask their shareholders to provide them with an adequate 
amount of capital, so to avoid bankruptcy if actual losses exceed expected ones. 
                                                      
3 Traditionally, fund managers regularly and routinely purchase insurance, either professional indemnity 
insurance (PII) or bond and fidelity coverage or both. By carefully examining insurance-claim files, it can 
be clearly seen that fund managers incur losses that Basel would classify as either client, product and 
business practices, or internal and external fraud. Furthermore, the fraud losses are protected by bond and 
fidelity coverage whereas client, product and business practice losses are associated with PII. 12 | ANDREA RESTI 
 
Figure 1.1 Expected and unexpected losses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Such worries were clearly expressed by several bankers and researchers in their commentaries 
to the NBCA discussion drafts. A 2002 CEPS research report
4 argued that the decision not to 
distinguish between expected and unexpected losses looked unsatisfactory and should be 
somewhat reconsidered. 
In late 2003, as the discussion on the NBCA was close to its final stage, the Basel Committee 
decided to introduce a clear separation between the EL and UL components of regulatory capital 
for banks adopting internal-ratings systems.
5 Under this modified approach, the IRB capital 
requirement is based solely on the unexpected-loss portion of the IRB calculations. Meanwhile, 
a separate treatment of expected losses was designed, with the objective of ensuring strong 
incentives for banks to provision properly against them.  
In practice, banks are now required to compare the IRB measurement of expected losses with 
the total amount of provisions (both general and specific) that they have set aside. If this 
comparison produces a ‘shortfall’ (that is, if expected losses exceed total provisions), such an 
amount will be deducted from capital. If, instead, total provisions exceed the expected loss, such 
excess will be included in tier 2 capital (as it presently happens for general provisions), subject 
to a (still undisclosed) maximum limit. 
Although this new approach provides a correct incentive for banks to provision against expected 
losses, such behaviour is encouraged, but not compulsorily required. In other words, banks may 
still operate with a level of provisions that falls sharply below the expected losses implied by 
their loan portfolios and cover such a shortfall with shareholders’ capital. In this sense, although 
the last-minute modification introduced by the Committee goes in the right direction, it still 
looks only partly adequate. 
                                                      
4 See Resti (2002). 
5 No changes were introduced into the standardised approach. 
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1.7  Second pillar: Supervisory review 
Under the NBCA, regulatory capital represents the main source of risk coverage. Nevertheless, 
the new Accord states that the ability of a bank to effectively cover its risks also depends on the 
existence of an adequate risk-management system made up of sound internal-control processes, 
operating limits imposed on individual desks or business units, reliable provisioning schemes 
and sensible capital-planning policies. The supervisory review process carried out by national 
authorities will therefore play a key role under the NBCA, in prompting banks to develop, refine 
and better use risk-measurement techniques. 
This second pillar of the new Accord will translate into four main lines of action. The national 
regulators will: 
  check that the bank’s risk-management systems comply with the specifications included in 
the first pillar of the NBCA (such as transparency, integrity and consistency of the internal 
rating system); 
  evaluate risks that fall under the provisions of the first pillar, but which may be imperfectly 
estimated by its computation formulae (for example the correlation and concentration 
effects included in the new Accord through a set of standard values may not be appropriate 
for individual banks); 
  assess risks not included under the first pillar (e.g. the interest-rate risk originated by the 
different maturity mix of assets and liabilities); and 
  evaluate how the economic cycle could affect the bank’s future capital adequacy. Such 
effects will have to be estimated though ‘stress tests’, simulating how the bank’s capital 
requirements would change if a recession were to occur.  
In the prudential supervision process, regulators will: a) verify that each bank has a sound 
system in place to assess its own capital needs and a sensible strategy to ensure that its capital 
remains adequate in the future; b) review and validate such a system, taking appropriate steps 
whenever it is not fully satisfactory; c) if necessary, impose capital requirements above and 
beyond the regulatory minimum stated in the first pillar; and d) act in a quick and timely manner 
(asking for prompt corrective actions) to prevent the bank’s capital from falling below the 
minimum threshold suggested by its risk profile. 
The enhanced tasks and duties of the supervisory authorities will bring about a sharp need for 
new, technically skilled staff; thus, investing in human resources will become an issue not only 
for banks subject to the new Accord, but also (and especially) for supervisors charged with its 
implementation in the national jurisdictions. A common technical ground among national 
supervisors is also required if the Accord is to be applied uniformly across the banking systems 
of the EU, becoming a driver for integration, rather than introducing new regulatory barriers. 
1.8  Third pillar: Market discipline 
The third pillar aims at providing the investors with all the relevant information that may help 
them to assess the risk profile of a bank. They will then be able to discipline banks (by 
requiring, for example, higher spreads on subordinated bonds) operating with an inadequate 
capital endowment or an ineffective risk-management system or both. Banks are therefore 
required to release a set of minimum data, both quantitative (e.g. capital adequacy measures and 
the main aggregates on which capital computation is based) and qualitative (risk-assessment 
methodologies and related organisational processes). 
To avoid burdening the banks with unnecessary and complex tasks, as well as flooding the 
market with a flow of unimportant data, the NBCA states that financial institutions will have to 
disclose only relevant information (i.e. data such that the omission or inaccurate representation 14 | ANDREA RESTI 
 
thereof may alter or affect the judgement of the investors relying on them). A list of the main 
pieces of information that will have to be made known to the public is also provided.  
As a rule, the information required by the third pillar must be released every six months (every 
year for qualitative data concerning the bank’s credit policies, reporting and management 
systems; every quarter for quantitative data on capital ratios and related aggregates). The 
transparency requirements of the third pillar do not apply to any exclusive or confidential 
information that, if made known to the bank’s competitors, could decrease the value of the bank, 
reducing its competitive advantage. 
1.9  Overview and policy issues 
The NBCA aims at closing the gap between economic and regulatory capital. As such, it should 
be welcomed by all interested parties: not just by supervisors or depositors, but also by bankers 
who do not want to be crowded out by the unfair competition of institutions operating with an 
inadequate amount of capital. 
Nevertheless, the goal of assessing risk in a more realistic and sophisticated way requires 
introducing higher degrees of complexity into the measurement system. Moreover, while large 
banks introducing their own internal credit-risk management systems during the 1990s were 
free to choose the tools more apt to their specific business and to achieve a degree of accuracy 
that was consistent with their own cost/benefit analyses, the introduction of new risk-assessment 
tools for regulatory purposes is likely to leave considerably less room for flexibility. Such tools 
may also increase costs in those areas where benefits are less immediate. 
To address such concerns, the Basel Committee has assembled a risk-measurement framework 
that tries to combine accuracy and flexibility, envisaging an evolutionary approach that aims at 
keeping compulsory costs at a minimum, while designing a road map for banks wishing to 
evolve towards more sophisticated systems. We believe that such an approach represents a 
credible and incentive-compatible framework. Yet, as the brief overview of the NBCA 
presented in this paragraph has made apparent, it suffers from several limitations. 
First, the new standardised approach that banks could implement to limit compliance costs 
marks only a very limited improvement over the previous Accord. Although a number of useful 
refinements have been introduced, namely on the treatment of risk-mitigants such as collateral 
and guarantees, the basic structure of the buckets only marginally enhances the banks’ ability to 
match capital and risk. On one hand, most bank loans appear likely to fall into the unrated 
bucket and retain an 8% capital charge; on the other hand external ratings, when present, will 
expropriate bankers from their risk-assessment capacity, instead of refining it – and will 
possibly create the threat of generalised credit crunches against downgraded borrowers.  
Such limitations suggest that most banks (or at least a number of large banks accounting for 
most bank loans) in the industrialised countries will be induced to move to the IRB approach. 
Within this framework, banks will have to choose whether to adopt some ‘supervisory’ standard 
coefficients to assess recovery and exposure risks or to face considerable spending on internal 
archives and algorithms before they are allowed to independently assess the level of risk of their 
loans. Even after standing all the costs implied by an advanced IRB system, banks will have to 
stick to the regulatory measures of concentration and correlation risks; such measures do not 
create the right incentives for geographic or industrial diversification and – as with the fixed 8% 
ratio dictated by Basel I – could actually turn out to encourage riskier credit portfolios. 
To ensure that banks duly consider all concentration and correlation issues that are not explicitly 
covered by the first pillar, the NBCA enhances the supervisory powers of national authorities. 
This choice, however, implies two risks. First, the actual implementation of the new Accord BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 15 
 
may evolve in different ways in the different national jurisdictions of the EU. The aim of a level 
playing field, which was one of the key drivers behind the 1988 Accord, would then be severely 
jeopardised. Second, as highlighted by the European Shadow Financial Regulatory Committee 
(ESFRC),
6 if supervisors become too deeply involved in the measurement and management of 
credit risks inside individual banks, this might cause ‘regulatory capture’ phenomena: that is, it 
would be harder for supervisors to stand at arm’s length from the institutions they are supposed 
to monitor from outside. 
Finally, the degree of extra complexity brought about by the new Accord is clearly apparent in 
the area of operational risks. Here, banks will have to choose between simple capital-
computation criteria – which bear only a vague relationship to the actual risk levels faced by a 
financial institution – and a set of advanced management approaches still under development, 
representing a long-term investment with benefits and costs that cannot be assessed, even 
roughly, in advance. 
 
                                                      
6 See ESFRC (2003).  
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Chapter 2 
Lessons from the QIS-3 Results 
Rym Ayadi* 
he third quantitative impact study (QIS-3) was conducted by the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision to understand the possible effects of the Basel II proposals (as of 
late 2002) on capital levels across participating banks.
1 This chapter lays out some of the 
results contained in the report of the Committee’s third quantitative impact study (QIS-3) and 
the findings of the European Commission’s quantitative impact study, and offers a critical 
analysis of the potential impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on banks and portfolios.  
2.1  Overview of the QIS-3 results reported by the Basel Committee and the 
European Commission 
Since 2001, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has conducted three major 
data collection exercises to gather the necessary information to measure the effects of the new 
proposals on banks’ capital requirements (across the different risk exposures) and to enable 
banks to participate and prepare themselves for an efficient implementation. In October 2002, 
the Committee released the QIS-3 technical guidance that was used by banks to assess the 
impact of the new Accord on their portfolios. This technical exercise permitted the gathering of 
the data necessary to gauge the effects of the Accord and to refine the calibration of its 
proposals. A total of 188 banks from the G10 countries participated in the study, with a further 
177 banks from other countries (see Table 2.1).  
Table 2.1 Number of banks submitting results for each approach  
Approach   G10* EU Other**  Total
Standardised   185 166 140  365
IRB Foundation  109 89 28  159
IRB Advanced  57 32 11  74
* The G10 countries are: Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US.  
** Other countries include: Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Chile, China, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Malta, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Thailand and Turkey. 
Source: Basel Committee (2003a). 
 
As with previous exercises, banks calculated the capital requirements for consolidated group 
exposures on a worldwide basis. From a methodological standpoint, the Basel Committee opted 
for what they called the ‘constant sample analysis’,  which is based on having an identical 
sample of banks submitting results for all three approaches.
2 Banks were divided into two 
                                                      
* Rym Ayadi is a Research Fellow at CEPS. She thanks Andrea Resti, Karel Lannoo, Bernhard Speyer, 
Jos Wieleman and Javier Echarri for their helpful remarks and suggestions on an earlier draft. 
1 The constant evolution of the Basel proposal implies that the QIS-3 may not be a sufficient indicator of 
the effect of the present proposal. 
2 Banks submitting results for more advanced approaches are a sub-sample of those banks submitting 
figures for more standard ones. 
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groups: group 1 banks are large, diversified and internationally active with tier 1 capital in 
excess of €3 billion; group 2 banks are smaller and in many cases specialised.  
In the meantime, the European Commission services assisted the Basel Committee in the QIS-3 
exercise to produce data on the impact on the banking system of the EU area plus six accession 
countries. Their methodology was slightly different from that used by the Committee. Besides 
the constant sample analysis, they chose to perform the complementary sample analysis, which 
is based on having each bank that participated in the exercise only submitting data on the effects 
of the approach it would most probably adopt on the implementation date in 2007. This 
methodology is more likely to reflect the real impact of the new framework on the banking 
system. Moreover, calculations were based on weighted averages,
3 which could provide more 
accurate indications of the impact of the new capital framework, as they better reflect the 
differences in size existing between the various national banking systems in the EU and in 
several accession countries.  
2.1.1  Impact on the overall capital requirements for different groups of banks 
The QIS-3 results are shown in Table 2.2, in terms of the changes to minimum capital 
requirements relative to the current Accord – under each approach for both credit and 
operational risk. (For reference only, the Commission’s figures are added in italics.) These 
results were said to be broadly consistent with the Committee’s objectives, mainly to leave the 
level of capital held by the banking system unchanged while providing incentives to institutions 
that adopt the more sophisticated approaches. These results are summarised as follows: 
•  Capital requirements are generally unchanged for large, internationally active banks, 
irregardless of the approach they adopt.  
•  The proposals seem to offer an incentive for internationally active banks to adopt the more 
sophisticated internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches, which could guarantee a slightly 
lower capital charge.
4 
•  For smaller and more domestically oriented G10 and EU banks, capital requirements could 
be substantially lower under the IRB approaches than current ones.  
•  In the other countries, there is significant variation depending on the conditions in different 
markets and the activity focus of the banks. 
It should be noted that the average impact figures may hide a significant variation across 
banking institutions. This was simply explained by the composition of the portfolio, related to 
the relative importance of retail activity. As the QIS-3 report points out, “banks with a large 
proportion of retail exposures generally have significantly lower capital requirements under the 
new approaches, reflecting the generally lower risk in this portfolio”. On average, smaller banks 
experienced the most important reduction in the overall capital requirements, reflecting their 
higher exposures to retail activity.  
For EU banks, the variation measured by the average standard deviation was shown to be 
increasing with the degree of sophistication of the approach used and decreasing for larger and 
internationally active banks. This dispersion was attributed to the new operational-risk charge 
                                                      
3 Weighted averages were used as opposed to the simple average of results by individual country that was 
used by the Basel Committee.  
4 In its statement, the Basel Committee seems to be unusually conservative, leading to an underestimation 
of the likely change in overall capital requirements, which could experience a substantial overall 
reduction and may have potentially adverse consequences for the stability of the banking system (ESFRC, 
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that considerably changed the capital requirements for some specialised banks, which prior to 
Basel II, only faced reduced capital requirements. It is important to mention, however, that 
banks were confronted with data collection difficulties, particularly with respect to identifying 
all eligible collaterals. Further, not all banks met the standards laid down by the Committee for 
setting probability of default (PD), loss-given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD), 
which led to some variation in the results across banks and also to an overestimation of the 
credit-risk charges under the different approaches. 
Table 2.2 Overall percentage change in capital requirements including operational-risk 
charges 
  Standardised  IRB foundation  IRB advanced 
 Average  ASD*  Max.  Min.  Average  ASD Max.  Min.  Average  ASD  Max.  Min. 
G10 group 1  11% –  84%  -15% 3% –  55% -32% -2%  –  46%  -36%
G10 group 2  3% –  81%  -23% -19% –  41% -58% –  –  –  – 
EU group 1  6%
(8.54%)
 
(7.47%)  31% -7% -4%
(1.99%) 12.05% 55% -32% -6% 
(-3.67) 
 
(12.95%)  26% -31%
EU group 2  1%
(-1.07%)
 
(11.15%)  81% -67% -20%
(-23.8%) 13.84% 41% -58% -22.45% 
(-17%) 
 
(22.04%)  – – 
Other 
Groups 1 & 2  12% – 103%  -17% 4% –  75% -33% –  –  – – 
*Average standard deviation figures provided by the Commission document that indicate the degree to which individual results tend 
to vary from the average. 
Sources: Basel Committee (2003b) and European Commission (2003a). 
 
2.1.2  Impact on the capital requirement across banking portfolios  
The results summarised in Table 2.3 show a considerable variation in the extent to which capital 
requirements will rise or fall under Basel II for different portfolios. This could reflect the 
relative risk insensitivity of the 1988 Accord (Basel I), which logically leads to requirements 
that are currently high or low relative to the risk carried within the different portfolios. For 
instance, retail exposures including small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and mortgages 
carry relatively higher risk-weights under Basel I compared with the new Accord, whereas 
exposures to sovereigns, which are zero-risk weighted under Basel I, will have to carry higher 
risk charges under Basel II rules. Hence, winners under Basel II may include SMEs and 
mortgages, whereas sovereigns may be losers.  
The contribution to the change in capital requirements across portfolios varies under the 
different approaches. Under the standardised approach, the most significant reduction in the 
credit-risk charges is derived from the retail portfolio, where the risk weights have been lowered 
significantly for all sub-portfolios compared with the Basel I Accord. This reduction was a 
fairly expected consequence of a) the reduction in the risk weight (from the current 50% to 
35%) for residential mortgages; b) the decrease in the risk weight from 100% to 75% for non-
mortgage retail business, which also benefits loans to those SMEs that can be treated as retail; 
and c) the importance of retail business for many banks participating in the exercise, in 
particular, the smaller and more specialised ones.  
With respect to the other banking portfolios, the patterns of change are different: capital 
requirements for corporate portfolios showed little change as most exposures were reported as 
unrated and in general the risk-weight for unsecured exposures does not change from that under 
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collateral. For interbank and sovereign exposures, the patterns vary bank by bank, although 
overall there are increases in capital requirements reflecting lower-rated exposures. 
Nevertheless the contribution of these portfolios to the overall results is not significant because 
of their relatively small size and the current low-risk weighting. 
Table 2.3 The contribution to the change in capital requirements
5 across selected portfolios*  
  Standardised approach  IRB foundation approach   IRB advanced 
approach  
Portfolios   G10  EU  Other G10  EU  Other  G10  EU 
 G1  G2  G1  G2  G1&2  G1  G2 G1  G2  G1&2  G1 G1 
Corporate   1%  -1% 
-1% 
(0.22%) 
-1% 
(-0.74%)
0% -2%  -4% 
-5% 
(-2.19%)
-5% 
(-3.79%) 
-1% -4% 
-4% 
(-2.84%) 
Sovereign 0%  0% 
0%  
(0.29%) 
0% 
(0.03%) 
1% 2%  0% 
2% 
(1.56%) 
1% 
(0.69%) 
1% 1% 
1% 
(0.71%) 
Bank 2%  0% 
2% 
(1.61%) 
1% 
(1.30%) 
2% 2%  -1% 
2% 
(2.04%) 
-1% 
(1.11%) 
1% 0% 
-1% 
(-0.53%) 
Retail -5%  -10% 
-5% 
(-4.72%) 
-7% 
(-9.33%)
-4% -9%  -17% 
-9% 
(-8.70%)
-18% 
(-22.46%) 
-8% -9% 
-9% 
(-8.65%) 
SME -1%  -2% 
-2% 
(-1.23%) 
-2% 
(-2.23%)
-1% -2%  -4% 
-3% 
(-3.14%)
-5% 
(-4.93%) 
1% -3% 
-4% 
(-5.05%) 
Securitised 
assets  1% 0% 
1% 
(1.06%) 
0% 
(0.07%) 
0% 0%  -1% 
0% 
(0.89%) 
-1% 
(-1.82%) 
1% 0% 
0% 
(0.73%) 
General 
provision   – –  –  –  –  –  –  (-2.26%) (-2.57%)  – -2% 
-3% 
(-2.20%) 
Other  PF  2%  1% 2%  -1%  3% 4%  3% 3%  5%  5% 2% 4% 
Overall 
credit risk  0%  -11% -3%  -11%  2%  -7%  -27% -13%  -27%  -3%  -13% -15% 
Operational 
risk  10% 15% 
8% 
(8.08%) 
12% 
(9.41%) 
11% 10% 7% 
9% 
(9.06%) 
6% 
(6.36%) 
7% 11% 
10% 
(9.67%) 
Overall 
change  11%  3% 6%  1%  12%  3%  -19%  -4%  -20%  4% -2%  -6% 
*The overall change from the 8% capital requirements. 
Note:  Figures in italics represent the Commission’s results based on the weighted average. 
Sources: Basel Committee (2003b) and European Commission (2003a). 
 
On average, the reduction in the credit-risk charges is outweighed by the increase in the capital 
requirements resulting from the new operational-risk charge, which varies between a change of 
8% and 15%. As a result, the total capital requirement is a little higher for the G10 and EU 
group 1 banks and almost unchanged for the G10 and EU group 2 banks.  
Under the IRB foundation, banks based their assessment of the quality of their portfolios on the 
calculation of the probability of default. The results show a further reduction in capital 
requirements for retail portfolios compared with the standardised approach.
6 This reduction is 
more significant for smaller banks owing to their greater involvement in retail activities. More 
                                                      
5 This table should be read carefully; it shows the change in the contribution to the total capital position 
and not the relative change per portfolio 
6 As for retail exposures, the Committee sets only one IRB approach under which banks provide the loss 
given default (LGD) and exposure at default (EAD), as well as the probability of default (PD). 20 | RYM AYADI 
 
specifically, the retail mortgage book, having the largest contribution in the retail portfolio, has 
the greatest impact on the overall results, while experiencing on average the highest reduction in 
capital requirements compared with other retail asset classes. 
Capital requirements for corporate exposures are generally found to be lower than those under 
the Basel I Accord. This reduction could be explained by the importance of exposures to high-
quality borrowers within these portfolios and the recognition of physical collateral – as long as 
it meets the standards set by the Committee (e.g. the value must not be correlated with the 
creditworthiness of the borrower).  
With respect to loans to SMEs – including those treated as corporate or as retail exposures – 
capital requirements are generally expected to be lower than current ones. For the first category 
of SMEs, the changes made to the corporate risk-weight curve following the second consultative 
paper (CP2) and the introduction of a size function (with lower requirements for exposures to 
small companies) have significantly lowered the capital requirements on good and medium-
quality exposures. Loans to SMEs that are treated as retail exposures will have even lower 
requirements owing to the use of the retail risk-weight curve.  
Exposures to sovereigns could be subject to slightly higher capital requirements for EU group 1 
and 2 banks, although the average quality of these portfolios remains high. This increase may 
relate to the exposures of some EU banks to emerging markets.  
Finally, unlike the standardised approach, the increase in operational-risk charges does not 
outweigh the large reduction in capital requirements for credit risk, for either G10 group 2 banks 
or EU group 1 and 2 banks. The use of a more sophisticated regulatory approach would allow 
smaller banks to hold less regulatory capital than is currently required. This reduction is 
primarily a consequence of the special treatment of the retail portfolio.  
Under the IRB advanced approach, the results show an overall decrease in minimum capital 
requirements. Compared with the foundation approach, there is some variance mainly owing to 
sample differences, given that banks completing the advanced approach are only a sub-set of 
those completing the foundation one. Also, under the advanced approach, banks set their own 
LGDs and EADs for all portfolios, which were different from the supervisory estimates used by 
banks completing the foundation approach. For example, the average LGDs set by banks for 
interbank and corporate portfolios were rather lower than the fixed LGDs set by the Committee 
for the use of the foundation approach. Moreover, there was a considerable variability across 
banks completing the advanced approach, with many using higher LGDs than the Committee 
estimates.  
In summary, these results may suggest that banks with a large retail portfolio are likely to 
benefit from the more advanced capital adequacy rules. This may be attractive and one could 
expect banks to streamline their business-line portfolios and focus on the activities that could 
offer this advantage. Yet basing the choice of business lines only on regulatory capital needs 
may be too simplistic; in fact, this choice should be determined by a cost-benefit analysis. In 
other words, if banks are sufficiently capitalised and if a particular activity yields a fully risk-
adjusted return, then banks will still target this business segment. Holding less regulatory capital 
for one or another business line may be considered a competitive advantage when the risk is 
well-priced, but probably not the key driver to target a new business. Indeed, advantageous 
regulatory treatment of some businesses such as the retail portfolio is certainly favourable for 
banks with a large proportion of this type of exposure and whose aim is to more efficiently 
reallocate the amount of regulatory capital released. Nevertheless, on an aggregate level, this 
advantage should also serve to maintain the soundness of the banking system, as levels of 
capital and bank soundness are directly related. Indeed, highly capitalised banks have greater 
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2.2  Evaluation of the QIS-3 results 
Originally, the aim of the QIS-3 was to ensure that on average the minimum capital 
requirements remain unchanged when using the new capital adequacy approaches. Surprisingly, 
the Committee seemed to be partly satisfied with this evaluation exercise, even when it 
recognised the data collection difficulties encountered. This rather unusual, conservative 
behaviour may lead to an underestimation of the likely change in overall capital requirements, 
which could result in a substantial overall reduction and potentially jeopardise the stability of 
the banking system. 
2.2.1  Issues raised by the QIS-3 results 
The QIS-3 results indicate that the use of the IRB approaches would permit banks (particularly 
smaller ones) to release capital. Indeed, banks that have an active involvement in retail activities 
will be somewhat penalised if they remain under the standardised approach. Not only are they 
missing the opportunity to better assess their risks, but they are also likely to see the biggest 
drops in capital requirements if they develop IRB-compliant tools and procedures. This would 
hold an important lesson for all institutions that are going to adhere to the new regulatory capital 
regime. Indeed, to fully benefit from the more sophisticated risk-management approaches, 
institutions will have to improve the quality of their data, particularly with respect to credit-risk 
mitigation, which was an area where respondents found it difficult to provide the data needed to 
use the new forms of eligible collateral. This is also true with respect to the calculation of 
probability of default, loss given default and exposure at default – where some institutions failed 
to meet the data standards set up by the Committee – as well as to the assignment of SMEs to 
the different categories of SME exposures (corporate and retail). Nevertheless, in order to 
comply with the internal ratings-based approaches, banks will need to invest substantially not 
only in risk-management tools and procedures but also in the acquisition of risk-management 
expertise. Such investment decisions should follow a cost-benefit analysis to ensure that 
expected benefits will outweigh the fixed costs. 
2.2.2  Critical analysis of the QIS-3 results and the lessons to learn 
The QIS-3 is certainly a step forward and a good starting point to refine the calibration of the 
new capital rules, but this step is rather incomplete and some expectations on the part of the 
Basel Committee and the European Commission Services need to be reviewed. Indeed, whereas 
the importance of the correct calibration of the parameters in the new Accord is prominent, 
relying only on the QIS-3 results is debatable for the reasons below.  
The substantial variance shown in the QIS-3 results has been mainly and simply attributed to the 
high-risk sensitivity of the new rules and to the more or less large share of retail activity of some 
banks. This explanation is, however, rather general and does not reveal the limits of the sample, 
the data, the definition or criteria used, nor the time horizon taken into consideration.  
•  First, the only information provided about the sample is that it includes 365 banks divided 
into large, diversified and internationally active banks, and smaller and more specialised 
banks from the G10, EU and other countries. Given this rather rough distribution, the 
Committee did not provide any information about the asset shares of the participating banks 
in the region where they operate. This is of a major importance for indicating whether or not 
the sample is representative.  
•  Second, considering the quality of the data submitted, the Basel Committee itself recognised 
a number of difficulties with the data collection exercise. Indeed, banks found it difficult to 
identify eligible collaterals under the different approaches. This problem is more significant 
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collateral types. Many banks underreported collateralisation because of system constraints, 
which implies the difficulty of gathering data on exposures and collaterals and generating it 
in the format required for the QIS-3. Thus, an overestimation of capital requirements under 
these approaches has resulted. In addition, as stated by the Committee, many institutions 
failed to meet the data standards set with respect to the calculation of PD, LGD and EAD. 
As an example, there was an important variation across banks in the calculation of these risk 
components leading to relatively low PDs and LGDs for the retail mortgage book, even 
though it represents a highly cyclical activity (with significant defaults and losses in 
economic downturns). These differences in estimates across banks could reflect the 
different historical experience in different countries and the extent to which banks were able 
to take into account stress conditions when calculating PDs and LGDs. Further, a number of 
banks reported their incapacity to assign exposures to the two different SME categories as 
their systems were not able to provide the distinct information to enable them to split SME 
exposures. Hence, most of the information provided (especially on firm size) was not 
accurate.  
•  Another major problem is the definition of ‘default’, which was left to national discretion in 
most of the cases. As a result, probabilities of default have been estimated differently – 
using time series constructed by banks under national and sometimes company definitions 
of default, which are not always consistent with the reference definition set out in the new 
Accord. As a consequence, the lack of comparability among the estimates owing to different 
definitions and criteria under different national supervisory regimes may cause substantial 
distortions. 
•  Finally, it is important to mention that the endorsement of the new treatment of expected 
and unexpected losses proposed by the Basel Committee,
7 which entails the calculations of 
IRB capital requirements solely on the basis of unexpected losses (as opposed to the 
proposals in the third consultative paper)
8 will certainly require the revision of the final 
calibrations of the new Accord.  
For these reasons, it is doubtful that based only on the QIS-3 results, the Committee and the 
Commission services could warrant the use of the advanced approaches to facilitate lower 
capital requirements. This objective has certainly been achieved in terms of overall approaches 
but not always for single portfolios under different approaches. Indeed, the QIS-3 results 
illustrated heavier capital charges on the sovereign, specialised lending and equity portfolios as 
opposed to lesser capital charges on retail portfolios.  
Consequently, there is a strong need for improvement with respect to the data collected and the 
consideration of the effect of solely unexpected losses to calculate credit-risk capital charges 
under the IRB approaches – to enable a more precise assessment and refinement of the new 
regulatory rules. The most important point for improvement is the use of a larger sample that 
would better reflect the real situation in the banking industry by region and that would also rely 
on better quality and complete data. It is also important to make sure that all banking services – 
including commercial, cooperative and savings banks as well as investment firms – are 
represented in the sample.  
The endorsement of the new treatment of expected and unexpected credit losses is a major 
reason for the Basel Committee and the Commission services to undertake another impact 
study, to re-evaluate the results generated by the data already collected (and if necessary to 
                                                      
7 Basel Committee (2003d). 
8 In the CP3, banks using the most sophisticated methods to calculate their credit risk capital needs were 
supposed to base their sums on estimates of the probability of expected and unexpected losses. BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 23 
 
recalibrate some of the risk-weight functions). Such analysis should occur before the 
implementation date in 2007, provided that the exercise will not cause a further delay in the 
Accord’s finalisation.
9 
As for the improvement of the QIS-3 results, after recognising the limits of the data and the 
sample, there are some concerns. First, collecting new sets of data or improved data from banks 
that already participated in the QIS-3 will certainly lead to a further delay in the Accord’s 
finalisation. Moreover, as some banks (particularly the smaller and medium-sized ones) will not 
be willing to invest in sound risk-management tools before the requirements set out in the new 
Accord are officially confirmed, there is no guarantee that the data quality would mark any 
substantial improvement relative to the QIS-3. 
As an alternative strategy, the Committee could proceed with the approval of the new Accord 
based on the partial improvement of the QIS-3 results through the new treatment of expected 
and unexpected losses – while continuing the improvement of the calibrations of the risk-
weights and the risk-functions through field tests before and during the first years in which the 
Accord is actually implemented. At the European level, the comitology procedure will allow for 
the rapid transposition of the technical changes to the third capital adequacy Directive (CAD 
III). 
 
                                                      
9 Many banking industry representatives have called for a QIS 4 before the implementation date – see 
ABI (2003), America’s Community Bankers (2003), British Bankers’ Association (2003) and Belgian 
Bankers’ Association (2003).  
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Chapter 3 
Impact of Basel II on 
Small- and Medium-Sized Credit Institutions 
Andrea Resti* 
uch attention has been paid to the impact of the New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA) 
on small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). This class of firms plays a pivotal 
role in some large European economies (like Germany and Italy); hence, their 
treatment under the new Accord has been revised several times – and the capital computation 
formulae for loans to those companies have been carefully calibrated – to ensure that no credit 
crunch would ensue from their application.  
Less consideration has been devoted – apparently – to the impact of the NBCA on small- and 
medium-sized banks (SMBs); however, this appears to be a critical issue from several points of 
view. 
First, there is often a similarity between the size of a bank and that of the customers it serves. In 
many local credit markets, SMBs are fundamental in ensuring that small businesses are 
supported in their financial needs: while large banking groups may face informational barriers 
in assessing the creditworthiness of smaller firms (and may opt for a limited presence in this 
market segment where they lack the necessary skills and roots), many regional banks enjoy a 
competitive advantage, owing to a better knowledge of the local economy. Reducing their 
potential for credit supply could then seriously endanger the ability of SMEs to grow and 
expand.  
Second, the implementation of the NBCA – although it represents a dramatic opportunity for 
banks to improve and refine their risk-management tools – is going to represent a considerable 
burden in terms of implementation and learning costs. Such fixed costs are likely to be better 
endured by large financial institutions, while their effect on SMBs may be higher. Thus, an 
acceleration of the consolidation process among local banks is likely to emerge as a result of the 
new Accord.  
This consequence remains true even if the approaches adopted by small banks to comply with 
the new Accord are likely to be simpler than those followed by large credit institutions (the 
standardised approach to credit-risk measurement and the basic indicator approach to 
operational risks are likely to be the most common ones among SMBs). The implementation 
costs of Basel II, in fact, are expected to go beyond regulatory costs in a narrow sense, and will 
comprise all the expenses required to adapt to a new market environment, where internal ratings 
and other risk-management tools will be necessary to avoid adverse selection effects.
1 
                                                      
* Andrea Resti is at the University of Bergamo. He is especially thankful to Ole Bus Henriksen, Bernhard 
Speyer and Peter Konesny for their valuable suggestions on a previous draft. Useful additions from Victor 
Dowd on operational risks are gratefully acknowledged. 
1 If the gap between small and larger intermediaries widens, this could lead to a sort of ‘winner’s curse’, 
jeopardising the future profitability and stability of local banks; in fact, as will be explained in this 
chapter, such banks may increase their market shares only to find out, in the following years, that they 
have supplied credit to the wrong borrowers (i.e. to borrowers deemed unprofitable by their larger 
competitors). To avoid this adverse-selection effect, even small banks will be forced to invest in sound 
credit-risk measurement systems, which in turn will considerably increase their implementation costs.  
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If implementation costs risk being more sizeable for small- and medium-sized banks, then it is 
important to check that they will not face a comparative disadvantage at least in terms of capital 
requirements. This chapter will assess the possible effects of the NBCA on the capital ratios of 
SMBs from various perspectives, as indicated in Figure 3.1.
 2 
The main factors that are likely to affect future capital requirements for SMBs are shown in 
Figure 3.1. The actual capital charge faced by each intermediary will depend on the type of 
approach it chooses and its portfolio mix (different classes of borrowers, different quality inside 
each class). As indicated by the grey shade in the graph, we expect that most SMBs will: 1) be 
more inclined towards simple, ready-to-use methodologies as the standardised approach to 
credit risk and the basic indicator approach to operational risk; and 2) benefit from an exposure 
mix that is more oriented towards individuals and small firms (that is, towards more granular 
portfolios that are somewhat rewarded by the NBCA).  
Figure 3.1. Different portfolios and methodologies: The likely positioning of SMBs  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the next two sections, we cover those effects separately, although the final impact on SMBs 
will clearly depend on how they interact in practice. To get a rough picture of this interaction, 
some data from the latest quantitative impact study (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
2003b and 2003c) will be presented in the third section. 
                                                      
2 Note that the capital measures considered in this paragraph comprise both expected losses (ELs) and 
unexpected losses (ULs) (even if Basel II ‘capital’ – narrowly intended – covers only the UL component). 
This choice is based on at least three justifications: 1) expected losses will still influence the total 
regulatory requirements for banks, although they may be covered through reserves as explained in chapter 
1 of this report; 2) comparisons with Basel I capital (which also includes reserves) would be biased if 
expected losses were to be left out; and 3) the latest empirical estimates on the impact of Basel II on 
European banks (the so-called ‘CP3’) do include both the UL and the EL component. 
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3.1  Effects of different risk-measurement approaches 
Figure 3.2 shows a comparative analysis of the capital requirements faced – on four different 
portfolios – by banks adopting either the standardised or the internal ratings-based (IRB) 
approach. 
The chart (based on the weighting functions stated in the third consultative package) indicates 
the capital charges on a €1 loan issued to borrowers of different sizes and levels of risk.
3 A 
rough estimate of the capital to be held against operational risk is also included.
4 To avoid 
crowding a single graph with too much data, Figure 3.2 has been divided into two panels: the 
first one, panel ‘a’ covers loans to medium to large companies, while the second one, panel ‘b’ 
portrays the case of individuals and small retail businesses. 
With regard to larger companies (panel ‘a’), one can see that banks adopting the standardised 
approach could enjoy a competitive advantage in the funding of risky borrowers (firms with a 
rating of B or below).
5 Banks adopting the IRB and the standardised approach would face 
roughly the same capital requirements for BB-rated obligors (which have an average historical 
probability of default [PD] of about 1%). In the case of medium-sized enterprises with a 
turnover below €50 million, such an ‘indifference point’ would move towards higher PD values 
(e.g. 2% for borrowers with a turnover of about €5 million). This effect is because the less-steep 
weighting curve associated with corporate SMEs would make IRB banks slightly more tolerant 
towards risk. A similar result emerges from panel ‘b’, where loans to small businesses and 
individuals are covered. 
Here, too, risky borrowers (say B-rated borrowers and below, with historical PD of 5% or more) 
are less expensive for banks adopting the standardised approach than for IRB banks; the 
opposite is true for highly rated obligors. In the case of retail loans, however, customers with a 
PD of 5% or above may still be appealing for lenders (given that average default rates tend to be 
higher, in this market, than for corporate loans); however, the results shown in panel ‘b’ would 
not hold for qualifying retail-revolving exposures (mainly credit cards and rotating overdrafts to 
individuals), for which a separate weighting function (not shown in Figure 3.2) has been 
proposed by the Committee. For such products, the indifference point between the standard and 
the IRB approach would only be reached for higher PDs (of about 14%). 
 
                                                      
3 In the case of the IRB approach, a 45% loss-given default (LGD) (and where relevant, a maturity of two 
and a half years) have been assumed. Note that these are the base values set by the Basel Committee for 
standard unsecured loans under the IRB-foundation methodology. Banks adopting the advanced IRB 
approach, however, may deviate from such values and face capital charges that are different from those 
shown in Figure 3.2.  
4 Such an estimate is based on the so-called ‘alternative standard approach’ stated in the third consultative 
paper: note that all loans to non-financial firms (including loans to small businesses) have been included 
in the commercial banking business line. In case some loans to small enterprises are ascribed to the retail 
banking sector, the capital consumption would decrease by about 10 basis points (capital against a €1000 
loan would decrease by €1). Moreover, if the estimates were carried out through the standardised 
approach or the so-called ‘basic indicator approach’, capital requirements against low-quality, unsecured 
loans (which usually yield a higher gross income) would have risen slightly. 
5 A slight advantage may also emerge for highly rated borrowers, although it depends on the availability 
of an external rating (which should not be taken for granted, at least in continental Europe). BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 27 
 
Figure 3.2 Capital charges by portfolio and approach 
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This brief analysis shows that small- and medium-sized banks adopting the standardised 
approach could be pushed towards lending to high-risk borrowers, since they would enjoy a 
relative advantage over larger banks adopting internal ratings, but only for this share of obligors 
(and the advantage would become more and more sizeable as the PD increases). Such a danger 
would not only be a microeconomic one, as systemic crises could result for SMBs if bank 
failures were to be triggered by the high loss-rates in the SME business. 
Clearly, the temptation to specialise in high-risk, high-return (and relatively high-leveraged) 
loans would be easier to resist for SMBs having a simple, sound rating scheme in place: a 
system probably not compliant with all the requisites set out in the NBCA, but at least able to 
spot and isolate the riskiest firms. This suggests that even banks adopting the standardised 
approach might consider investing in internal ratings, to prevent a generalised deterioration in 
the quality of their exposures. 
3.2  Effects of different portfolio mixes 
The same simulation data discussed in the previous section can be rearranged differently (see 
Figure 3.3) to see how different portfolios will affect the overall capital requirement of a small- 
and medium-sized bank, once it has chosen between the standardised and the (foundation) IRB 
approach to capital computation. 28 | ANDREA RESTI 
 
Figure 3.3 Capital charges by approach and portfolio type 
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Panel ‘a’ describes the situation for a bank adopting the standardised methodology. Note that 
this is going to be case for most small- and medium-sized banks. 
For loans to individuals, the capital requirement will be fixed at 6.53% (including an estimate of 
operational-risk charges). Roughly the same value applies to small firms without an external 
rating (as most SMB customers will probably be), if their total exposure towards the bank does 
not exceed €1 million. If that limit is exceeded, however, the capital charge increases by about 
30%, reaching 8.53%. The same ratio applies to large corporates. 
From a static perspective, the fact that SMBs have a portfolio mix that is more strongly oriented 
towards the retail business will help them enjoy lower capital requirements, when the flat 8% of 
Basel I is replaced by the system of weights indicated by the new standardised approach. From a 
dynamic point of view, moreover, the 2% difference between capital charges on small and large 
borrowers could act as an incentive for SMBs to further increase their presence in retail loans; 
note, however, that this is likely to be the market where competitive pressures from larger banks 
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In fact, panel ‘b’ shows that big institutions adopting the IRB-foundation methodology will also 
face lower capital requirements when moving towards more retail-oriented portfolios.
6 In other 
words, the lower capital consumption brought about by loans to individuals and small 
businesses is likely to act as a catalyst, making retail exposures more appealing even for large 
credit institutions (which now are relatively more focussed on large corporate loans, as well as 
on sovereign and interbank exposures).  
IRB banks, however, will have an incentive to ‘cherry-pick’ the least risky borrowers in the 
retail market: first, because they will have an adequate rating system to isolate and reject high-
risk borrowers, and second because highly rated retail loans will translate into lower capital 
requirements (in contrast to what happens in the standardised approach, where the retail curve is 
flat). Hence, the risk that SMBs find themselves specialising in junk retail exposures looks like 
a credible threat.  
To avoid such a threat, two avenues may, in principle, be followed. 
1)  Small- and medium-sized banks should invest in their own rating systems, which will 
probably be simpler and less structured than those required by the NBCA, even if such 
systems are not acceptable for regulatory purposes. In other words, SMBs should set up 
some minimal-rating structures, to be used as a self-defence tool, rather than for compliance 
purposes. 
2)  The implementation costs of a Basel-compliant IRB system should be scaled down, thus 
enabling many SMBs to invest in internal rating systems that can be used both for 
regulatory and credit-management purposes. In other words, supervision rules should give 
positive incentives, i.e. to SMBs to develop, to implement and to use modern and efficient 
risk-management systems – not only for their internal risk-management, but also for capital 
and supervisory purposes. One way to achieve such a goal, without watering down the 
consistency and soundness requirements that IRB systems must comply with to be validated 
by supervisors, would be to grant SMBs wider discretion to use the IRB approach on their 
core portfolios (e.g. corporate and retail borrowers), while sticking to the standardised 
approach permanently for non-core and some business units and exposure classes, such as 
sovereigns, public sector entities (PSEs) and banks.  
3.3  Some estimates on the impact of the NBCA on SMBs 
The results of the third quantitative impact study (QIS-3), carried out at the end of 2002 by the 
Basel Committee on an international sample of 365 banks, can be used to infer some possible 
consequences of the NBCA for small- and medium-sized banks. 
QIS-3 results do not  report separate data for small banks. They do, however, operate a 
distinction between group 1 banks (larger banks, internationally active, with tier 1 capital in 
excess of €3 billion) and group 2 banks (smaller and generally less complex banks that are not 
internationally active); the latter will be used in this section as a proxy for SMBs. Data on group 
2 institutions based in the EU are reported in Table 6. Note that the two columns in the table are 
                                                      
6 Note that, however, the discount associated with moving from corporate to retail exposures will not be 
constant, but will rather depend on the PD of the borrower. Consider, for example, the case of a bank that 
cuts its total exposure towards a borrower below the €1 million threshold, and thus moves the loan from 
the SME-corporate to the SME-retail portfolio. The amount of regulatory capital saved will be immaterial 
for high-quality customers, but will reach 2% to 4% of the exposure for average quality customers and 
will be as high as 9% for the most risky (CCC-rated) obligors. 30 | ANDREA RESTI 
 
not strictly comparable, as only 57 banks reported data on the foundation IRB methodology as 
well (as opposed to 160 institutions simulating the effects of the standardised approach).  
The results in Table 3.1 deserve some remarks. First, both the standardised and the IRB 
approach seem to bring about a decrease in total regulatory capital for group 2 banks. Yet while 
this decrease looks very modest under the standardised approach, it is quite sharp when the 
internal ratings-based methodology is applied. This may reflect differences in the two samples 
that completed the impact study for the standardised and the IRB approaches; however, it is also 
a sign that the loan portfolios of the regional banks participating in the QIS-3 were made mostly 
of low-risk borrowers and did not include a considerable share of junk exposures. IRB-
collaterals (such as physical capital and receivables), which are not recognised under the 
standardised approach, could also help explain the strong drop in the regulatory capital when the 
IRB rules are applied. 
The capital savings enjoyed by group 2 banks seem to be explained mainly by the retail 
portfolio (including individuals and small businesses). Corporate SMEs also give a substantial 
contribution to the reduction of the overall capital charge. On the other hand, the new 
requirement against operational risk is the main item driving up total capital compared with its 
current levels.  
Table 3.1 Changes in the capital requirements (as compared with the present Accord) for group 
2 banks: Total effect and contributions of individual sub-portfolios 
 Standardised Foundation  IRB
Sovereign 0.03% 0.69%
Bank 1.30% 1.11%
Retail (including small businesses)  -9.33% -22.46%
Corporate -0.74% -3.79%
Corporate SMEs  -2.23% -4.93%
Operational risk  9.41% 6.36%
Securitisation 0.07% -1.82%
Trading portfolio  0.10% 0.05%
Specialised lending  -0.61% 1.01%
Equity 0.14% 1.37%
Receivables 0.00% 0.00%
Investments in related entities  0.64% 1.12%
Use of general provisions  0.00% -2.57%
Total -1.22% -23.86%
Source: European Commission (2003a). Individual data were weighted based on each bank’s relevance inside 
its national system; national data were weighted according to the amount of regulatory capital (tier 1 + 
tier 2 – deductions) present under the current Accord in each of the 15 EU member states. 
3.4 Final  remarks 
This chapter has assessed the likely impact of the NBCA on small- and medium-sized banks. 
Several results have emerged, which can be summarised as follows: 
  The survival of some SMBs as independent entities could be endangered by the New Basel 
Capital Accord (NBCA), as the implementation costs of the Accord are fixed and their 
incidence is likely to be higher for smaller intermediaries. 
  Nevertheless, small- and medium-sized banks, having a portfolio mix that is significantly 
focused on retail exposures, will enjoy an initial advantage when the NBCA comes into BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 31 
 
effect regardless of the approach used. Under the IRB approach, however, such an 
advantage will be even greater as the average PD levels of their borrowers (according to the 
results of the QIS-3 exercise for regional banks) seem to be reasonably low (at least in the 
current phase of the economic cycle) and will trigger a considerable decrease in regulatory 
capital when the current 8% capital ratio is replaced by a more risk-sensitive system. 
Nevertheless, this is an average result and does not apply to each bank: for many SMBs the 
risk of an increase in regulatory capital (which would increase the strain owing to 
implementation costs) cannot be ruled out. 
  After Basel II is adopted by European regulators, competition is likely to increase mainly in 
the retail market, since it will command lower capital requirements while offering better 
gross margins. SMBs may therefore lose part of their informational advantage in issuing 
loans to individuals and small businesses, as competitive pressures from larger credit 
institutions intensify. 
  The standardised approach, which many SMBs are likely to adopt to keep compliance costs 
reasonably low, may bring about adverse-selection effects because of the fact that it 
imposes a flat capital requirement on all unrated issues, without rewarding those banks that 
lend to better quality borrowers. 
  To keep their competitive grip on the retail market and to counter adverse-selection effects, 
SMBs will possibly develop an interest in credit-rating systems; such systems, even if they 
may not be advanced enough to be acceptable for regulatory purposes, will represent 
another, indirect cost of Basel II for small- and medium-sized banks. 
  To match costs and benefits of investing in internal rating systems, a change in the present 
regulatory framework should be considered. The present Basel Committee proposals require 
banks to extend the IRB approach across the entire group as well as across all material asset 
classes.
7 This calls for the development of additional rating systems for sovereigns, PSEs 
and banks, an investment which – from our point of view – may be both too expensive and 
unnecessary for most SMBs. For these exposures, the standardised approach looks 
adequate, because external ratings (which are largely available for these classes of 
borrowers) could be used as a basis for risk assessment and capital measurement.
8 
                                                      
7 The Commission’s consultation document for an EU directive, in suggesting a phased rollout, hints that 
claims on sovereigns and claims on banks may be exempt from the IRB approach permanently, if there is 
only a limited number of counterparties in these asset classes. Consequently, the standardised approach 
may be applied on those exposures. 
8 Partial use is also a material issue for banking groups. Whereas for the parent company it could be easier 
to implement the IRB approach, for subsidiaries – especially in foreign countries or with a completely 
different business profile – it could be necessary to apply the standardised approach permanently. Given 
this situation, levelling the playing field between EU banks and Basel banks suggests that the ‘partial-use’ 
approach should be transferred into the New Basel Capital Accord.  
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Chapter 4 
Impact of the New Basel Capital Accord on SME Financing 
Rym Ayadi* 
ending to small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) under the new Basel II rules 
raised serious concerns among industry members and national regulators since the 
release of the second consultative paper (CP2).
1 It has often been argued that the new 
capital requirements for lending to SMEs will be higher since the default of these entities is 
more likely to occur compared with larger enterprises. The empirical evidence,
2 mostly oriented 
towards the relationship between average asset-correlation and a firm’s asset size, suggests that 
average asset-correlation is an increasing function of a firm’s asset size. In other words, the 
value of the asset correlation for an SME is lower than for larger firms, which makes the latter 
more sensitive to any changes in the macroeconomic environment compared with SMEs, which 
are mainly driven by idiosyncratic elements inherent to their own weaknesses.  
An excessive capital charge could discourage banks from granting loans to SMEs and provoke a 
shortage of finance for them. This situation would be prejudicial for the European economy as 
SMEs are known to be the most important source of growth and employment creation, and they 
already suffer from financing problems. Since the CP2, a careful analysis of the issue has been 
carried out by both regulators and industry members; finally, the empirical evidence supporting 
the relationship between asset-correlation and the size of the firm has been accepted.  
4.1  The Importance of the SME sector in the European economy 
SMEs play a central role in Europe. Indeed, according to the European Observatory of SMEs 
(2002), 20 million SMEs were providing jobs for more than 80 million people in the EU-19
3 
(see Table 4.1), which accounts for about two-thirds of total employment.  
Table 4.1 Main indicators of non-primary private enterprises for the EU-19 in 2000 
  SME LSE*  Total
  Micro Small Medium-sized Total      
         
Number of enterprises (x 1000)  19,040 1,200 170 20,410  40  20,450
Employment (x 1000)  41,750 23,080 15,960 80,790  40,960 121,750
Persons occupied by enterprise  2 20 95 –  1,020  –
Turnover per enterprise (€ million )  0.2 3 24 0.6  255  1.1
Value added per occupied person(x €1000)  40 75 105 65  115  80
Share of labour costs in value added (%)  66 66 58 63  49  56
*Large-scale enterprises. 
Sources: Estimated by EIM business and policy research, based on Eurostat’s SME database; also based on European 
Economy, Supplement A, June 2001 and Economic Outlook, No. 65, OECD, June 2001. 
                                                      
* Rym Ayadi is a Research Fellow at CEPS. She thanks Andrea Resti, Karel Lannoo, Bernhard Speyer, 
Jos Wieleman and Javier Echarri for their helpful remarks and suggestions on an earlier draft. 
1 Basel Committee (2001a). 
2 Lopez (2002); Dullmann & Scheule (2003). 
3 Member states of the EU plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland.  
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The SME sector is divided into three sub-categories: micro, small- and medium-sized. A 
harmonised SME definition was released by the European Commission in May 2003 and is 
planned to take effect from January 2005. This definition is based on four factors: number of 
employees, annual turnover, total balance sheet and independency (see Table 4.2).  
At first glance, it is obvious that the definition adopted by the Basel Committee is different from 
that of the European Commission as a consequence of their different focuses. The Basel II 
definition only considers the annual turnover and the size of the exposures, regardless of the 
number of employees or the total balance sheet of SMEs. What certainly matters is managing 
the risk of the exposures, which is consistent with the objective of limiting insolvencies in 
banks’ portfolios. The incorporation of the Basel II regulation into the European capital 
adequacy Directive will certainly help to bring about a needed consistency between the 
definitions. 
Table 4.2 Definition of SME 
Category  Employees  Turnover  Total balance sheet  Independence  
Micro  <10  €2 million   €2 million  
Small   <50  €10 million  €10 million 
Medium-sized  <250  €50 million  €43 million 
Given by <25% capital 
shares by third party 
Source: European Commission (2003c). 
 
When comparing productivity and development of the workforce as well as profitability of 
SMEs to large-scale enterprises (LSEs) over the period 1988-2001, SMEs showed satisfactory 
growth in productivity; they also contributed to an overall increase in employment and 
experienced a higher increase in the average profitability than LSEs (see Table 4.3). This is 
substantial evidence of the growth potential offered by SMEs to the European economy. 
Moreover, empirical research suggests that SMEs help stabilise overall employment, especially 
during periods of economic downturn.
4 Given this prominent role, it is important to ensure 
adequate financing to SMEs to promote their growth as it is essential to the prosperity of the 
European economy.  
In Europe, besides equity financing,
5 SMEs rely on different forms of external financing, 
ranging from overdrafts and bank loans to leasing, external investors, subventions and factoring. 
The availability of equity in SMEs varies among the European countries and among the 
different firm sizes (see Table 4.4). In some member states such as in Germany and Austria, 
SMEs rely much less on their own capital and in others such as in France, Belgium, Spain and 
Portugal, the share of equity in the total balance sheet ranges between 39% and 42%. A higher 
equity share could reduce the risk of an investment and provide a firm with wider access to 
external finance. According to a study performed by the European Commission, the most 
frequently used external financing sources are overdrafts, bank loans and leasing.
6 
 
                                                      
4 See Davis & Haltiwanger (1992); Fendel & Frenkel (1998).  
5 This is defined as the capital provided by the owner(s). The definition of equity may differ among the 
European countries.  
6 European Commission (2001a). 34 | RYM AYADI 
 
Table 4.3 Real value-added employment and profitability by country, EU-19 in 1988-2001 
(average annual change in %) 
  Real value added  Employment  Profitability 
  SMEs LSEs  SMEs LSEs  SMEs LSEs 
Austria 2.2  1.9 0 0.2 0.1  -0.1
Belgium 1.9  2.2 0.2 0 0.1  0.4
Denmark 2.6  2.8 0.1 0.2 0.6  0.7
Finland -0.1  0.1 -1.7 -1.6 -1.3  -1.2
France 1.3  2.4 0.3 0.7 -0.1  0.2
Germany 2.5  3.2 0.3 -0.3 0.3  0.6
Greece 3.3  2.3 2.1 1 -0.6  -3
Ireland 7.7  9.5 2.8 3.1 2.1  0.9
Italy 1.3  1.3 -0.3 -0.4 1.1  1.5
Luxembourg 5.4  4.8 2.6 1.1 0  0.4
Netherlands 2.1  2.5 1.1 0.9 0  0.3
Portugal 3  3.3 0.2 0.4 2.6  0.7
Spain 2.7  2.9 1.2 1.3 0.4  0.4
Sweden 1.6  0.8 -1.2 -1.4 0.1  -0.9
UK 2.4  2.3 -0.1 -0.9 0.2  0.2
EU 2  2.5 0.3 -0.1 0.5  0.3
Iceland 1.6  0 1.3 0.5 -0.6  2.7
Norway 3.2  3.9 1.5 1.5 0.2  1.1
Switzerland 1.6  1.7 0.4 0.1 0.5  2.1
Non-EU 2.2  2.5 0.7 0.4 0.3  2
Total 2.1  2.6 0.3 -0.1 0.5  0.3
Sources: Estimated by EIM business and policy research, based on Eurostat’s SME database; also based on European 
Economy, Supplement A, June 2001 and Economic Outlook, No. 65, OECD, June 2001. 
 
Table 4.4 Share of equity in the total balance sheet by enterprise size (in percentages) 
Size by turnover (million)  Austria Belgium France Germany Italy  Portugal   Spain
Less than €7m   13 40 34 14 26  31  42
Between €7m and €40m   27 38 35 22 25  40  43
€40m and more  31 39 35 31 28  51  37
All sizes  28 39 35 30 27  42  38
Source: European Commission (2001a). 
 
Nevertheless, the composition of external financing resources varies greatly among the 
European countries (see Table 4.5). In some member states such as in Austria and Germany, 
enterprises have traditionally relied on a close relationship with one local bank (the Hausbank 
principle), which is willing to lend even when business conditions are difficult. In other 
countries such as Denmark, Italy, Ireland and Sweden, enterprises have a particular preference 
to use overdrafts to finance their businesses. Overall, according to the Exco, Grant & Thornton 
survey on SMEs (2001), 46% of European SMEs rely on bank loans, 50% rely on overdrafts 
and 39% rely on leasing. Hence, the strong reliance on loan finance implies an equally strong 
need for collaterals to secure access to loans for healthy businesses.  BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 35 
 
Table 4.5 SMEs’ use of external financing in the EU (in percentages) 
 Overdrafts  Leasing  External 
investors  Factoring Bank  loans  Subventions 
Belgium 37  25  12  4  56  14 
Denmark 73  25  13  7  24  7 
Germany 47  43  5  2  66  7 
Greece 23  15  10  8  68  12 
Spain 8  48  15  15  58  10 
France   36  47  7  32  63  11 
Ireland 70  48  19  14  39  10 
Italy 78  41  7  17  17  10 
Luxembourg 22  33  15  11  44  15 
Netherlands 17  31  11  3  50  9 
Austria 42  39  1  6  65  8 
Portugal 16  47  7  10  48  6 
Finland 46  27  15  14  64  11 
Sweden 70  29  10  3  27  6 
United Kingdom  59  42  11  7  34  10 
Total EU  50  39  9  11  46  9 
Source: Exco, Grant & Thornton survey of SMEs (2001). 
4.2  The main problems facing European SMEs 
Traditionally, SMEs seem to have suffered problems with obtaining external financing 
particularly in the credit market, because of asymmetric information. According to Stiglitz and 
Weiss (1981), firms may suffer from credit rationing, which means that they do not get as much 
credit as they want even though they are willing to pay the interest rate set by their lenders and 
in other cases meet extra conditions to ensure their solvability. Let us recall that in most perfect 
markets, where there is an excess of demand, prices increase, which in turn leads to an increase 
of supply and then a decrease in demand. Nevertheless, in credit markets, lenders are not able to 
manipulate the interest rates and increase the supply of loans even if the demand remains 
unsatisfied.  
A key point to understanding credit rationing is the problem of asymmetric information between 
lenders and borrowers. Indeed, on the side of the borrower, when launching a new business or 
an innovative project, an entrepreneur (or an investor) is normally better informed about the 
project risks than those financing it. Information asymmetries may prevent lenders from 
observing the real nature of the borrower and also prevent them from influencing the borrower’s 
strategic behaviour after credit is released. As a result, the lender could voluntarily raise the risk 
premium on loans to properly manage its risks. In this case, lenders may attract riskier 
borrowers because of the adverse-selection principle or encourage riskier behaviour owing to 
the moral-hazard principle, which in turn enhances the probability of default and encourages 
credit rationing.  
SMEs suffer the most from the realities of imperfect credit markets. First, they are 
disadvantaged by their size, which prevents them from gaining access to capital markets easily 
and therefore encourages them to rely heavily on credit markets to finance their investment 
projects. Also, smaller firms are considered to be more vulnerable than larger ones as they face 
less rigorous reporting requirements owing to their age and their short credit history. Moreover, 36 | RYM AYADI 
 
some family-owned businesses are sometimes very sceptical of reporting strategic information 
such as business structure, growth opportunities, strategic orientation or ownership structure. 
Hence, several possibilities are offered to lenders to smooth out loan financing: the first of these 
involves asking for adequate collateral; the second strategy is that of preferring firms with a 
high equity-credit ratio. In the first strategy, it is not an easy task to provide adequate collateral 
and especially the type that protects the lender from the harmful effects of adverse selection and 
moral hazard.  
In the second strategy, the availability of equity in SMEs varies among countries and depends 
on the SME’s size. As shown in Table 4.4, equity shares vary between 13% and 51% in Europe. 
This variance is primarily a result of heterogeneous tax laws between the member states, which 
may be more favourable in some countries such as Belgium and less favourable in countries 
such as Germany. It is also important to raise the issue of adequate pricing in stock markets, 
which may be an important resource for facilitating new equity capital for firms in the start-up 
stage of their business cycle – which in turn will make it easier to obtain loans with favourable 
conditions. But, in the case of stock market crises, where a strong distortion in prices is implied, 
the opposite scenario could occur and the expansion of young firms would be undermined.  
Another problem that faces small- and medium-sized enterprises is the relatively high lending 
costs arising from the lack of competition among lenders in some regions, which enables them 
to charge interest rates that are in excess of what the underlying credit risk requires. Usually, 
small businesses are dependent on small local banks, implying a clear relationship between bank 
size and SME-lending, with larger banks having less exposure to small businesses.
7 Indeed, on 
the one hand small and local banks may have an advantage in offering finance to SMEs because 
of their local knowledge and experience, which in turn strengthens the bank-firm relationship 
and contributes to reducing information asymmetry; but on the other hand, this tends to create 
market power, allowing extraction of the surplus from SMEs. 
To illustrate the finance constraints facing SMEs, the results of the survey undertaken by the 
European Observatory of SMEs
8 indicate that about 30% of the firms with less than 50 
employees feel that access to finance is the major constraint to the development of their 
business (Figure 4.1). The same survey reveals large disparities across European Union 
countries. For instance, it seems that small- and medium-sized enterprises in Greece SMEs are 
the ones that suffer the most from lack of financing, followed by SMEs in Denmark. But for the 
other European countries, on average only 10% of SMEs consider access to finance a real 
constraint to their businesses (Figure 4.2). These results are rather informative but call for a 
more rigorous approach to ascertain whether finance constraints hinder the growth of small- and 
medium-sized enterprises.  
                                                      
7 Berger et al. (1998). 
8 The survey covers 7,600 SMEs in 19 European countries, see European Commission (2000 and 2002). BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 37 
 
Figure 4.1 Share of firms that consider access to finance to be the major business constraint, by 
size (in percentages) 
Figure 4.2 Share of SMEs that consider access to finance to be the major business constraint, 
by country in 1999 (in percentages) 
 
4.3  Possible impact of the capital regulatory rules on SME financing in the EU 
SMEs are recognised as the driving force behind economic growth in Europe. Their contribution 
to economic growth arises from their capacity to provide jobs for two-thirds of all employees. 
Nevertheless, some SMEs tend to be more risk-prone than larger firms because of their own 
weaknesses. One might think that the risk-sensitive rules introduced by the new regulatory 
framework could penalise those borrowers facing difficulties in their businesses by inflicting 
more capital charges on them, which would induce banks to limit credit access to SMEs. This 
scenario is more likely to happen when the economy is facing a downturn, forcing banks to 
adopt a more restrictive loan policy. Yet these concerns have been addressed by the Basel 
Committee and a discount was introduced to ensure that smaller firms are assigned a lower risk-
weight at the same probability of default compared with larger firms. Also, the flattening of the 
risk-weight curves and the introduction of longer time series for estimating the probability of 
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default will have an anti-cyclical effect in downturns and upswings. Given these changes, 
several questions arise: What is the rationale for such concessions? What are the direct and the 
indirect effects of the new capital rules on SMEs? What measures should be taken to promote 
SME financing under the new rating culture imposed by the new regulatory framework? 
4.3.1  Evolution of SME treatment under the New Basel Capital Accord  
The treatment of SMEs under the New Basel Capital Accord (NBCA) has secured considerable 
attention from regulators and practitioners owing to the importance of the SME sector for 
economic growth in many countries and particularly in the EU. Hence, significant efforts and 
time have been dedicated to ensure an appropriate treatment of credit risk associated with 
exposures to SMEs.  
Many changes have been undertaken since the first consultation period in January 2001, aimed 
at reconsidering the capital charges imposed on lending to SMEs under the internal ratings-
based (IRB) approach.
9 The changes were related to two fundamental issues: the calibration of 
the respective risk-weight functions and the definition of the dividing line between retail and 
corporate portfolios.  
In November 2001, the Committee introduced two fundamental modifications related to the 
January 2001 risk-weight curves, while leaving the door open for further specific 
considerations.
10 The main changes can be summed up in the following points: 
a)  Modification of the risk-weight curve for corporate exposures led to a change in capital 
requirements. This change was a result of the evidence suggesting that the asset-correlation 
is a decreasing function of probability of default (PD), leading to a decrease in the slope of 
the capital curve.
11 Hence, borrowers with higher risks of probability of default will 
certainly benefit from these changes. 
b)  A specific risk-weight curve was designed for other retail exposures,
12 which is different 
from the residential mortgage risk-weight curve. In this respect, an exposure to an SME 
could be included within the retail category because of its size.  
Since then, the Committee continued its extensive work on the SME issue until the new 
amendment of July 2002, where it announced three more changes aimed at decreasing the 
                                                      
9 Under the first draft of the Basel II proposals (Basel Committee 2001a), many commentators pointed out 
a calibration problem with the SME credit formulae, which led to a very steep risk-weight curve for 
SMEs and results in excessive capital charges on SME loans.  
10 Basel Committee (2001b). 
11 The modified November 2001 IRB formula differed from the one proposed in January 2001 in the 
following ways: there was no explicit scaling factor in the formula, the confidence level was increased 
from 0.995 to 0.999 and the asset correlation was set as a function of the PD. The final capital equation 
had this form: capital requirements = LGD*M*N[(1-R)^(-0.5) * G(PD)+ (R/(1-R))^(0.5)*G(0.999)]. LGD 
stands for the loss given default, R is the correlation coefficient = 0.1*(1-exp(-50*PD)) / (1-exp(-50)) + 
0.2*[1-(1-exp(-50*PD)) / (1-exp(-50))]; M is the maturity adjustment, M= (1+0.047*((1-PD)/PD^0.44)); 
N(x) denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function and G(y) stands for the inverse of the 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
12 This curve varied with respect to the January 2001 one in that the correlation coefficient was no longer 
a constant but a function of the probability of default; it did not contain an explicit scaling factor nor an 
implicit maturity one and it incorporated a higher confidence level. The capital equation was as follows: 
capital requirements = LGD* N[(1-R)^(-0.5) * G(PD)+ (R/(1-R))^(0.5)*G(0.999)] – LGD*PD. R= 0.04*(1-
exp(-25*PD)) / (1-exp(-25)) + 0.15 * [1-(1-exp(-25*PD)) / (1-exp(-25))]. It has to be noted that in this 
curve expected losses are covered by margin income. BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 39 
 
amount of capital required depending on the size of the borrower.
13 The first change was a 
substantial reduction of the risk weight for other retail exposures under the standardised 
approach from 100% to 75%. The second one was the flattening of the corporate risk-weight 
curve, with a particular consideration for credit exposures to SMEs included in the corporate 
asset category (see Figure 4.3). And the third change was the introduction of three risk-weight 
curves for different retail exposures (see Figure 4.4).  
Consequently, a substantial differentiation between SMEs and larger firms was introduced, as a 
result of the explicit relationship found empirically between asset-correlation and firm size. 
Finally, the July modifications were materialised in the curves made public by the Basel 
Committee when the third quantitative impact study (QIS-3) was launched in October 2002.
14 
Those curves were formally presented in the third consultative paper (CP3) in April 2003.
15 
With respect to the definition of SMEs, a quantitative criterion for defining an exposure to an 
SME as lying within the retail or the corporate boundaries has been introduced. Hence, these 
two types of SME exposures were addressed. First, an SME is treated in the corporate asset 
class when the total annual sales are lower than €50 million and total exposure to a bank is 
greater than €1 million. A discount factor, which can reach 20%, is introduced for lending to 
this type of borrower. Second, SME loans below an exposure size of €1 million can be treated in 
the retail portfolio (this is subject to a concentration limit and to the requirement that the lending 
institution actually treats such exposures as retail).
16 The capital requirement in the retail 
portfolio is generally lower than the corporate portfolio. 
Following these changes along the process, SMEs will be assessed under the three approaches 
of the new Accord. For banks that choose to rate their risk exposures under the standardised 
approach, SMEs treated as corporate borrowers will receive a risk weight of between 20% and 
150%, depending on their rating class quality.
17 Unrated exposures will receive a 100% risk 
weight, which is equivalent to the current 8% of the unweighted loan. SMEs that are qualified as 
retail borrowers will receive a 75% risk weight.  
                                                      
13 Basel Committee (2002a). 
14 Regarding the IRB approach, the curve for corporate exposures was as follows: capital requirements = 
LGD* N[(1-R)^(-0.5) * G(PD)+ (R/(1-R))^(0.5)*G(0.999)] * (1- 1.5 * b(PD))^(-1) * (1+ (M-2.5) * b(PD)). 
In this equation R is, again, the correlation coefficient, R= 0.12 * (1-exp(-50*PD)) / (1-exp(-50)) + 0.24* 
[1-(1-exp(-50*PD)) / (1-exp(-50))]; M is the maturity and b is the maturity adjustment, b = (0.08451-
0.05898 * log(PD))^2. The curve for other retail exposures was finally set out as: capital requirements = 
LGD* N[(1-R)^(-0.5) * G(PD) + (R/(1-R))^(0.5)*G(0.999)], where R=0.02 * (1-exp(-35*PD)) / (1-exp(-
35)) + 0.17* [1-(1-exp(-35*PD)) / (1-exp(-35))]. 
15 Basel Committee (2003a). 
16 This encourages banks to treat as many clients as possible under the retail approach. Furthermore, 
between the retail and the lowest SME curve there is a gap that will result in a ‘cliff effect’ and thus 
opportunities for arbitrage. 
17 As explained in chapter 1, the capital charge on a high-quality loan of €100 to an SME rated AAA to 
AA- is €20 of risk weighted asset multiplied by the original 8% leading to a total of €1.6 (in other words 
1.6% of the unweighted exposure). In contrast, a low-quality loan to an SME will give rise to a capital 
charge of 150x8% = €12, which is 12% of the unweighted exposure. 40 | RYM AYADI 
 
Figure 4.3 Decrease in CP3 risk weights for corporate exposures 
(LGD 45%; Maturity 2.5 years) 
Figure 4.4 New risk-weight curve calibration for retail exposures (maturity = 2.5 y) 
New risk-weight curves calibration for retail exposures (maturity = 2.5 y)
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The treatment of secured loans for SMEs has received a particular attention in two cases. When 
the loans are secured by commercial real estate, they receive in principle a risk-weight of 100%. 
Nevertheless, national supervisors will be allowed to assign a reduced risk-weight of 50% for 
50% of the market value or 60% of the mortgage-lending value when two supervisory tests are 
fulfilled.
18 When the loans are secured by mortgages on residential property, they will receive a 
risk weight of 35%. Any unsecured exposure will have a risk weight of 100%. 
Finally, banks providing venture capital or other equity capital to SMEs will have to risk weight 
their exposures by 100%. For some cases, national supervisors will apply a risk weight of 150% 
to such exposures.  
Under the IRB approach, two alternatives are offered to banks according to whether they use the 
foundation or the advanced IRB to rate their SME portfolio. Under the foundation approach, 
banks will have to provide estimates for PDs internally (based on historical data about the 
borrower) and rely on supervisory estimates for loss given default (LGD), exposure at default 
(EAD) and maturity (M). Under the advanced approach, banks will have to estimate all these 
risk components internally. Some differences exist as to whether the SME is treated as a 
corporate or as a retail borrower. When an SME is treated as a corporate obligor under the 
foundation IRB approach, its risk weight depends on the PD, the LGD and the firm size. The 
LGD for uncollateralised positions is set at 45% and 75% of the loan and is explicitly 
subordinated.
19 The level of LGD may, however, be reduced to 0% depending on the collateral 
(eligible financial collateral, receivables, and commercial and residential real-estate will receive 
respectively an LGD of 0% and 35%). Under the advanced approach, the bank is allowed to 
estimate the risk parameters of an SME exposure. Further, the internal estimates of LGD may 
lead to lower capital requirements if collateral exists. For uncollateralized positions, the 
advanced approach may lead to higher capital requirements as the LGD is not limited to 45%. 
As for EAD and maturity, the internal estimates may vary across banks and lead to more or less 
capital charges.  
When an SME fulfils the qualifying criteria to be treated as a retail exposure, a bank must 
provide its own estimates of the underlying risk components irregardless of whether it is 
applying the foundation or the advanced IRB approach. The risk weight depends on the 
estimates of the PD, LGD and EAD. This would theoretically lead to lowering the capital 
requirement compared with the risk weight function for corporates.
20 
4.3.2  The rationale for the Committee’s decision  
The favourable treatment of SME exposures by the NBCA could be justified by the special 
characteristics associated with SMEs. Indeed, the concept of different risk-weight formulae for 
SMEs and large businesses was mainly rooted in the following assumptions:  
                                                      
18 These two tests are: a) the losses resulting from commercial real-estate lending of up to 50% of the 
market value and 60% of the mortgage-lending value must not exceed 0.3% of the outstanding loans in a 
given year; and b) overall losses resulting from commercial real-estate lending must not exceed 0.5% of 
the outstanding loans in a given year.  
19 A subordinated loan is a facility that is expressly subordinated to another facility. At national 
discretion, supervisors may choose to employ a wider definition of subordination. This may include 
economic subordination, such as in cases where the facility is unsecured and the bulk of the borrower’s 
assets are used to secure other exposures (NBCA, para. 257, April 2003). 
20 This statement is consistent with the QIS-3 results.  42 | RYM AYADI 
 
a)  There is a lower default correlation for SMEs; indeed although SMEs are supposed to be 
riskier on an individual basis than larger firms, implying higher default rates in turn, the 
coefficient of the variation of default associated with them appears to be smaller. 
Consequently, the default rates of small firms can be predicted with higher accuracy. 
b)  There is a positive effect resulting from diversification when loans to these firms are 
integrated into a sizable loan portfolio. As SMEs’ higher default rates are mainly because of 
idiosyncratic risk, SMEs’ credit-risk can be diversified in a large portfolio. These two 
attributes mean that when applying good risk-management practices, banks could consider 
SME exposures, to some extent, as less risky than lending to larger firms.  
Default correlations allow the analysis of the extent to which non-borrower specific or 
systematic risk is responsible for default probability. The financial condition of firms in the 
same industry or within the same country may reflect similar factors and may thus improve or 
deteriorate in a correlated trend. In such cases, their defaults would be highly correlated. 
Furthermore, these common factors are not expected to remain stationary over time as they 
could be affected by the state of the economy. Hence, the lower the default correlation of firms, 
the less firms are affected by the same factors and the more the default is related to idiosyncratic 
or borrower-specific risk.  
For both assumptions, the Basel Committee concentrated on the concept of asset-correlation, 
which is an indicator of the sensitivity of exposures to systematic risk. Theoretical support was 
provided by Resti (2002), who shows that the use of a lower asset-correlation coefficient for 
riskier borrowers represents a reasonable way of making the weighting function less steep and 
reducing the threat of a generalised increase in the cost of credit.  
Empirically, research has yielded mixed findings. On the one hand, Lopez (2002) indicated that 
the average asset correlation is a decreasing function of PD and an increasing function of a 
firm’s asset size. This result tends to confirm that large firms are relatively more sensitive to 
systematic risk than SMEs. On the other hand, the negative relationship between PDs and 
default correlation was rejected by Dietsch & Petey (2003), when applied to a sample of French 
and German SMEs and instead found to be U-shaped for French SMEs and positive for German 
SMEs. Further, another piece of evidence given by Dullmann & Scheule (2003) when applied to 
a sample of German corporate obligors suggested that default correlation decreases with firm 
size; this means that larger SMEs should probably receive a more favourable treatment than 
smaller ones. 
Finally, when qualifying the concessions made by the Committee, it is true that from a 
macroeconomic perspective, the decision to have an asset-correlation parameter declining with 
PDs may be justifiable by the desire to reduce the procyclical effects of the new Accord.
21 From 
a microeconomic standpoint, however, not only does a too-flat curve have the potential to 
distort a bank’s pricing of risk at a given point in time,
22 but the relationship between PDs and 
asset-correlation is also ambiguous and leads to a possible unfair treatment of larger enterprises 
as compared with smaller ones. This would suggest that more empirical investigation is needed 
on the relationships between default correlation and PDs along with default correlation and firm 
size in all European countries.  
                                                      
21 Since procyclicality is driven by the relative slope of the curve, one can achieve only a very modest 
degree of smoothing without causing significant distortion to relative capital charges across borrowers 
(Gordy & Howells, 2003). 
22 Kashyap & Stein (2003). BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 43 
 
In summary, the changes undertaken by the Committee with regard to SME treatment 
demonstrated an important degree of flexibility. Even though the results of the quantitative 
impact study attempt an overall reduction of capital requirements for the SME portfolio, it is 
important to conduct SME-targeted analysis on the impact of the NBCA, given the importance 
of this sector to the European economy. 
4.3.3  The New Basel Capital Accord and SME financing in Europe  
In Europe, the majority of SMEs rely on loan financing; however, another option exists for a 
bank – which is to finance companies through equity, either directly or through venture capital.  
Implications for loan finance  
The new Basel capital rules will certainly impact the credit conditions for SMEs, but not 
necessarily by leading to a reduction of credit supply to these entities. The more risk-sensitive 
pricing introduced by the new rules will entail a certain variance in capital adequacy depending 
on the individual quality of the borrower. A poor-quality borrower will force its lender to hold 
more regulatory capital compared with a better-quality borrower, but this does not ban loan 
financing.  
The QIS-3 results showed that irregardless of the category to which the SME exposure is 
assigned (to the corporate or the retail portfolio), the new regulatory capital rules will yield a 
lower SME risk weight compared with the existing framework. Yet these results should be 
interpreted with caution;
23 moreover, the average reduction does not mask a strong variance 
between banking institutions of different sizes, when adopting the standardised, the foundation 
or the advanced IRB approaches. These different approaches will certainly generate differences 
in capital requirements for SME portfolios, favouring to some extent the large internationally 
active banks that are more willing to adopt the advanced IRB approach and thus benefit from a 
considerable capital discount on SMEs. This may address the issue of the likely competitive 
effect that the implementation of the capital adequacy Directive (CAD III) will have on banks 
offering credit to SMEs in Europe.
24 
Hence, the existence and the application of sophisticated credit-risk management tools will be a 
key element for banks to qualify for the advanced IRB approaches and to ensure in turn better 
risk-management of their credit portfolios, including the exposures to SMEs. Other small or 
medium-sized banking institutions that have poorer internal risk-management systems and are 
unwilling to install more sophisticated tools will have to adopt the standardised approach, a 
fairly improved version of the current capital regulatory rules but one that does not necessarily 
lead to higher or lower capital charges for the SME portfolio than the current rules. 
Traditionally, these banks are often active locally and are the main supply sources of external 
finance to SMEs. While they have a strong long-term relationship
25 with their clients based on a 
local knowledge and experience, (which helps to reduce information asymmetries), they may 
profit from their local dominant position by extracting ‘rents’ from SMEs.  
                                                      
23 See Chapter 2. 
24 Evidence in the US market for credit to SMEs revealed a relatively minor competitive effect on the 
majority of community banks that do not adopt the IRB approaches, primarily because the organisations 
that are likely to adopt the IRB-advanced approach tend to make very different kinds of SME loans to 
different kinds of borrowers than community banks (Berger, 2004). 
25 Boot (2000). 44 | RYM AYADI 
 
It is also worth mentioning that by offering the opportunity for banking institutions to benefit 
from the most sophisticated approaches, the new capital adequacy regime will create an 
additional burden in terms of implementation and learning costs. These costs are better absorbed 
within a higher-activity volume. This consequence would suggest an acceleration of the 
consolidation process among small- and medium-sized banking institutions. In Europe, 
consolidation in the banking sector has already reached high levels, but so far the empirical 
studies are not sufficient to conclude that banking consolidation is detrimental to credit 
availability for SMEs.
26 
Finally, the higher risk-sensitivity introduced in the new capital adequacy regime, while 
drawing a more precise picture of the creditworthiness of borrowers, is likely to raise capital 
charges in times of economic downturn. As a result, capital requirements may become a 
limitation for granting loans to SMEs and others, which in turn could intensify the economic 
slowdown. The procyclical effect of the new Accord arises from the use of risk-sensitive 
techniques in the internal credit-risk systems. These effects are certainly different while using 
the standardised or the IRB approaches. Indeed, according to a study by the Bank of England
27 
that sought to estimate the extent to which banks would downgrade loans in a recession, the 
results were that ratings based on Moody’s approach lead to little, if any increase of capital 
requirements, whereas, ratings based on a Merton-type model leads to an increase of 40% to 
50%.
28 The strong reactivity of the Merton-type model is mainly related to the correlation of the 
probabilities of default to the economic cycle. Indeed, the probabilities of default are lower 
when the economic conditions are favourable and higher when the economy experiences a 
downturn. In their paper, Edward Altman et al. investigated the link between probabilities of 
default and loss given default and the effects of procyclicality on capital requirements.
29 They 
found that banks that estimate probabilities of default and loss-given default had to reduce their 
credit portfolios to a larger extent, compared with banks that only estimate PDs and rely on 
supervisory estimates of LGDs. This finding is clear evidence that the procyclicality of the 
Accord is more prominent when using the advanced IRB approach. Returning to SMEs, these 
entities will certainly suffer a lack of financing when the economy is in a downturn. This will 
have a direct negative effect on growth, suggesting that some corrective measures be put in 
place to avoid exacerbating the cycle.
30 
Implications for equity finance  
Banks also have the alternative to finance SMEs through equity either directly or by investing in 
a private equity or venture capital. Under the Basel I Accord, equity positions are risk-weighted 
at 100%, which does not correctly reflect the underlying risk of such volatile exposures. Instead, 
under the standardised approach, a general risk-weight of 100% (which can reach 150% at 
national discretion) is assigned for venture capital and private equity. Under the IRB approach, 
any equity is subject to a set of approaches. If a bank is using the simple market-based 
approach, this will entail risk weights of 300% for firms with publicly traded equities and 400% 
for those with private equities. Otherwise, the other approaches may trigger more differentiated 
risk weights, which may not be lower than 200% for firms with publicly traded equities and 
300% for those with private equities. For some long-term investments or existing positions, 
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29 See Altman et al. (2002). 
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exemptions or transitional arrangements may apply and lead to a risk weight of 100%. All other 
investments will provoke significantly higher capital charges. The treatment of such exposures 
under Basel II is a reflection of the high amount of risk they involve. Nevertheless, this 
treatment may limit the attractiveness of this type of financing. The higher charges imposed on 
direct-equity financing and bank investments in private equity and venture capital business in 
Europe will hinder banking institutions from investing in such businesses, as they are becoming 
very costly.
31 
Some SMEs, in particular those developing new technologies (‘high-tech’ SMEs) and relying to 
some extent on venture capital financing, will be somewhat affected by this treatment.
32 Indeed, 
developing new technologies is considered to be a risky business in addition to the uncertainty 
of expected returns and where the problem of information asymmetries is prominent.  
To control the overall risks of their investments, the idea of venture capital is to pool different 
categories of risks into a fund to benefit utmost from the diversification effect. To illustrate this, 
a study by Mathonet & Weidig (2004) looked at the risk profile of three investment strategies in 
private equity and venture capital, ranging from direct private-equity investments in a company, 
to investments in funds and investments in funds of funds (see Table 4.6). The findings confirm 
the positive effect of diversification for reducing risk.  
Table 4.6 Differences in the probability of loss among the various private equity investment 
vehicles 
  Fund of funds  Fund  Direct investment 
Probability of total loss  0%  1%  30% 
Probability of any loss   1%  30%  42% 
Source: Mathonet & Weidig (2004). 
 
For the time being, the Basel Committee followed the assumption that default risk can be 
measured independently, thus excluding the advantages of diversification when various risks are 
pooled within one portfolio. This assumption may be somewhat restrictive. The problem of 
failing to consider the advantages of diversification, at least for equity exposures, is the 
progressive withdrawal of banks from private equity and venture capital businesses, which can 
affect 25% of capital committed to finance innovative but risky SMEs. 
4.3.4  Measures to promote SME financing 
As demonstrated by the analysis, information asymmetries between borrowers and lenders are 
one of the most prominent financing constraints. The establishment of a long-term relationship 
based on increased transparency is the backbone of solutions to reduce these information 
asymmetries.
33 Transparency under the New Basel Capital Accord is a precondition for an 
effective cooperation between lenders and SMEs. Adopting one of the IRB approaches will 
mean that banks have to rely extensively on a set of quantitative and qualitative information 
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provided by SMEs. This information is the key to running the internal rating system properly. 
Companies that are well managed, well financed and provide timely, relevant information will 
be in a position to obtain an adequate rating and consequently some adequate credit conditions. 
Hence, it is crucial that companies understand and accommodate the new capital requirements 
in order to provide the most relevant information needed by lenders to rate their risk exposures 
internally (see Box 4.1).  
 
It is true that the main financing source of SMEs is bank loans and overdrafts. But, relying on 
only one source could lead to banks having a dominant position. This may be addressed by 
promoting other sources of financing. As showed by the Exco, Grant & Thornton survey, 
leasing is among the more frequently used source of external financing by European SMEs after 
bank financing.
34 Yet patterns differ across countries: in the UK and Ireland, SMEs already rely 
on leasing; in other European countries, bank loans and overdraft financing is more prominent, 
but with a growing consideration of leasing. According to Stulz & Johnson, (1985) leasing can 
mitigate the problem of under-investment or credit rationing faced by some companies. 
Empirical findings based on US firms reached a consensus on the fact that leasing is a financing 
mode that enables businesses to mitigate agency costs and address information asymmetry.
35 
Promoting alternative sources of external financing for SMEs could be an adequate response to 
tackling information asymmetries and avoid some of the potentially adverse implications of the 
new capital regulatory rules. Despite these factors, the treatment of the leasing business by the 
New Basel Capital Accord has created additional adverse effects, notably in terms of 
competitive distortion. 
                                                      
34 See the Exco, Grant & Thornton survey (2001). 
35 See Sharpe & Nguyen (1995); Graham, Lemmon & Schallheim (1998). 
Box 4.1. Steps of a prototypical risk-classification process from a bank’s point of view 
1.  Assessment of a borrower’s financial status 
¾  Result of step 1: Preliminary borrower rating 
2.  Analysis of management quality 
3.  Analysis of the borrower’s competitive position 
4.  Assessment of the quality of financial information 
5.  Analysis of country risk 
6.  Comparison with external rating information (if available) 
7.  Analysis of lending structure 
¾  Results of steps 1 to 7: Final borrower rating and probability of default 
8.  Assessment of loss in case of default across the various facilities 
¾  Final result: Facility rating (determination of probability of default and expected amount 
of losses) 
Source: Crouhy et al. (2002).  
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Chapter 5 
Recognition of Physical Collaterals under Basel II  
The Case of Lease Contracts 
Mathias Schmit* 
5.1  Role of physical collaterals 
In 2002, it was estimated that new businesses in leasing rose to more than €199 billion,
1 while 
the penetration rate of equipment leasing in comparison with total equipment investments in 
fixed assets reached 15%. Lease financing is particularly relevant for small- and medium-sized 
enterprises (SMEs), as shown in a study by Exco, Grant & Thornton (2001), which estimates 
that about 39% of European SMEs use leasing as a means of financing (as compared with 46% 
for bank loans). 
A theoretical perspective on the role of physical collaterals in various sources of financing, such 
as senior-secured debt and leasing, has been given by many academics. Thus, Stulz and Johnson 
(1985) suggest that secured debts and lease financing should be able to mitigate the problem of 
underinvestment, or credit-rationing, faced by some companies. The authors point out that 
secured debt makes it possible to undertake numerous projects whose current net value is 
positive, whereas implementing such projects with an ordinary debt would be unfeasible (since 
they would compete with the existing debt). There currently appears to be a general consensus, 
based on empirical findings, that secured means of financing are ‘advantageous’ financing 
instruments in situations where a firm is facing problems of information asymmetry and that 
these enable businesses to mitigate agency costs (see for example studies by Lasfer & Levis, 
1998, based on UK firm sample; see also Sharpe & Nguyen, 1995, and Graham, Lemmon & 
Schallheim, 1998, based on US firm samples).  
5.2  Importance of Basel II recognition of physical collateral for SME financing  
Leasing is characterised by the fact that the lessor has the legal title of ownership of the leased 
asset during the entire lease term. This arrangement, combined with lease specialists’ expertise 
in secondary markets generally places them in a favourable position to repossess the leased 
assets in case of default. In this way, physical collaterals largely contribute to the reduction of 
the credit-risk associated with leasing exposures.  
The issue of recognising physical collateral under Basel II in the leasing industry has been 
addressed from an empirical point of view in a number of studies (see Table 5.1). These studies 
are meant to collect further information on credit-risk issues in leasing. All five studies are 
based on different sets of data composed of retail exposures.  
These empirical studies confirm that recovery rates for leases are comparable to those for the 
best senior-secured bank loans. It is worth highlighting that the recovery rates are on average 
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more than 70% for automotive leases. Moreover, in some cases, recovery rates may exceed 
100%, as the resale value of the leased asset can be higher than the outstanding amount at 
default.  
Table 5.1 Empirical studies on credit risk in the leasing industry 
  Schmit & Stuyck 
(2002)  Schmit (2003) 
Degouys, Delzelle, 
Stuyck & Wautelet 
(2003) 
Schmit (2004) 
Pirotte, Schmit 
& Vaessen 
(2004) 
Sample  37,259 contracts  35,861 contracts  28,784 contracts  46,732 contracts  4,828 contracts 
Origin  12 institutions 
(6 countries)  1 institution (A)  1 institution (B)  1 institution (A)  1 institution (A) 
Timeframe  1976–2002  1990–2000   1997–2001  1990–2000    1990–2001 
Type of 
contracts 
Automotive, 
equipment, real 
estate 
Automotive  Automotive & 
equipment 
Automotive, 
office equipment, 
medical 
equipment and 
other equipment 
Automotive 
Focus Recovery  rates 
PD, LGD, loss 
distribution 
(CreditRisk +) 
PD, LGD, loss 
distribution 
(Bootstrap) 
PD, LGD, loss 
distribution 
(Bootstrap) 
LGD and 
residual value  
Notes: PD refers to probability of default and LGD refers to loss-given default. 
 
Four of the studies in Table 5.1 concentrate on loss distribution in leasing and stress the 
importance of the role played by physical collaterals in reducing the credit risk associated with 
lease portfolios. These obtain consistent conclusions while using not only different data sets but 
also two different loss distribution estimation methods (CreditRisk+ and Bootstrap). Empirical 
results from Schmit (2004) are presented in Figures 5.1a, 5.1b, 5.1c & 5.1d below. These figures 
illustrate the simulations on capital requirements as calculated on the basis of re-sampling 
methodology and of the Basel proposal’s internal ratings-based (IRB) approaches.  
These graphs show that: 
  The standard approach (dotted line on the graph) as well as the IRB foundation (light blue 
bars on the graph) and IRB advanced approaches (dark blue bars on the graph) lead to 
capital requirements that are significantly higher than requirements calculated according to 
the internal model (violet bars on the graph).  
  There is a contradiction with the Basel II objective to provide reasonable
2 incentives in 
terms of capital relief for banks to adopt a more sophisticated approach: the IRB foundation 
approach (light blue bars on the graph), although more advanced than the standard one, will 
lead to higher regulatory capital requirements for a significant portion of the segments 
studied (except for medical equipment, as shown in Figure 5.1b). 
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Figures 5.1a, 5.1b, 5.1c & 5.1d. Comparison between IRB regulatory capital requirements and 
capital requirements derived from internal model 
 
Source: Schmit (2004). 
 
The large discrepancies in capital requirements observed among the three different approaches 
of the new capital adequacy framework can partly be explained by the absence of adjustment to 
the capital requirement for retail portfolios under the IRB foundation approach and the low 
relief granted for physical collaterals.
3 It implies that for leasing companies wishing to move 
from the standard to a more sophisticated approach, there would be no other options than i) to 
adopt the IRB foundation approach as a transitional strategy despite the significant increase in 
capital requirements involved for retail portfolios; or ii) directly move to the IRB advanced 
approach. Companies adopting the most advanced approach will, however, have to meet the 
challenge of collecting sufficient and reliable data in order to build their internal models. As 
only a relatively small number of financial institutions will be able to directly opt for the IRB 
advanced approach, the lack of recognition of physical collaterals could generate a distortion of 
competition in the equipment-financing industry. Furthermore, given the amount of resources 
and data needed to complete the implementation of the IRB advanced approach and gain the 
supervisor’s approval, a significant number of European leasing companies are unlikely to be 
able to opt for the second option as from 2006.  
Another crucial issue relates to the capital requirement calculated on market risk, in addition to 
the one calculated on credit risk for lease contracts exposed to residual-value risk. This puts 
companies at a disadvantage. Indeed, when returns on leased assets are carefully monitored and 
residual values are set conservatively – as should be the case given the minimum requirements 
for the recognition of physical collaterals – the weighting ratio should be adapted to a more 
realistic level than the proposed 100% weighting ratio, as shown in a research carried out by 
Pirotte, Schmit & Vaessen (2004). 
                                                      
3 Under the standard approach, eligible physical collaterals are limited to real estate; under the IRB 
foundation approach, the capital relief granted is constrained by a regulatory floor to loss-given default 
(LGD) adjustment (a maximum decrease in LGD from 45% to 40%).  
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Additionally, financial institutions should comply with a large number of minimum 
requirements so that certain types of risk-mitigating tools are recognised. Yet these 
requirements may not be adequate for leases and other exposures characterised by the presence 
of collaterals. For instance, the requirement set under Basel II to carry out individual assessment 
of lease assets in the form of a periodic physical inspection takes into account neither the 
peculiarities nor the very nature of lease contracts. In fact, since specific provisions for the 
leasing industry are not clearly set in the regulatory framework, some confusion among 
professionals of the industry arose around the question as to exactly which approach should be 
used to observe these minimum requirements.  
When looking at the recognition of physical collaterals, the issues mentioned above highlight 
the need for further refinement of the Basel capital adequacy framework. Indeed, since the 
specificities of the leasing sector are not adequately taken into account, SMEs do not entirely 
benefit from the advantages that this financial source could offer them. Further, in its current 
version, the framework may not be able to create a genuine level playing field, because it 
implies that different means of financing with similar underlying risk may be assigned different 
capital requirements according to their form rather than their economic substance. 
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Chapter 6 
Procyclicality and Dynamic Provisioning 
Frank Dierick* 
6.1  The concept of procyclicality  
The concept of procyclicality used in the context of banks’ lending activities refers to the 
phenomenon that their loan business tends to follow the same cyclical pattern as that of the real 
economy, i.e. strong growth in an economic upturn and slow growth or even a decrease in an 
economic downturn. Banks’ profitability follows a similar procyclical pattern because loan 
provisions and losses typically fall in a boom (thus having a positive impact on profitability) 
and rise in a recession. This is explained by the present bank practice to make only loan 
provisions and write-downs when credit losses are likely to occur or have actually materialised. 
In behaving this way, the banking system further amplifies business cycle fluctuations, which 
raises a number of concerns. First, it can lead to a misallocation of resources and sub-optimal 
investment behaviour. In an economic upturn projects with a negative net present value may be 
financed, while in a downturn even positive net present value projects may be rejected. Second, 
systemic risk could increase. A typical illustration is the fuelling of an asset bubble through 
generous credit conditions and higher collateral values. The subsequent deflation of the bubble 
may cause a banking crisis and a credit crunch. Third, there is an international dimension to be 
considered as banks’ lending responses to domestic cyclical movements affects their 
international business, thus carrying the risk that a crisis is exported. Fourth, as credit risks only 
manifest themselves in banks’ accounts after the upswing during which they have been built-up, 
the disciplining of banks by the market and supervisors may prove to be more difficult.  
6.1.1 Possible  causes 
Although the issue of procyclicality has come very much to the fore in the recent debate about 
the new Capital Accord, it is important to note that even without a solvency regulation, the 
banking system tends to behave in a procyclical way. The academic literature has identified a 
number of possible explanations, which are rooted in problems of asymmetric information and 
market imperfections. Most of the explanations can be grouped under the headings of human 
psychology, business practices and regulations. 
People have a tendency to put excessive weight on recent events, to underestimate high-loss 
low-probability events (‘disaster myopia’) and to interpret information in such a way that beliefs 
are reinforced. These psychological factors lead to a misperception of risk, in particular to the 
assumption that prevailing booms (or busts) will continue and will also affect loan officers’ 
lending decisions. Herding behaviour can also play a role as banks may want to avoid the 
potential costs of separating themselves from their peers. 
Short-term perceptions may likewise be stimulated by certain business practices. For example, 
up-front bonuses that have not been adjusted for risk may be paid-out to generate loan business, 
the bank may focus on capturing market share instead of pricing for the full risk of the loans and 
loan officers’ ability to assess risks may deteriorate over time (e.g. because a new generation of 
officers has emerged that have not yet experienced a loan bust). An important business practice 
                                                      
* Frank Dierick is at the European Central Bank. 52 | FRANK DIERICK 
 
is the acceptance of collateral as a way to reduce asymmetric information problems in lending. 
As asset prices increase, asymmetric information problems become less of a concern, which 
increases the financing possibilities for intrinsically less-creditworthy participants. In the case of 
a fall in asset prices, lenders again become more concerned about information problems and 
may resort to credit rationing to avoid adverse selection.  
Finally, regulations can also have procyclical effects. Accounting and tax rules may stimulate 
banks to make loan provisions or write-downs only when credit losses are likely to occur or 
have already materialised. This will lead to increasing profits in a boom (or decreasing profits in 
a bust), which in turn affects lending behaviour. Thus regulations should give particular 
attention to solvency requirements. 
6.2  Procyclical effects of solvency requirements 
6.2.1  Under Basel I 
Procyclicality concerns have already been voiced in the context of the Basel Capital Accord of 
1988, in particular with respect to the impact of credit provisions and losses, as well as the 
composition of banks’ own funds.  
Banks’ specific loan provisions and losses increase when an economic downturn occurs. If a 
bank’s existing general provisions are insufficient, this will result in a decrease of its own funds 
and solvency ratio. As the bank grows closer to its minimum required level of its own funds (as 
determined internally or fixed by supervisors), it may want to rebalance its solvency ratio again. 
This can be done either by increasing its own funds or by reducing the volume of risk-weighted 
assets, which in practice amounts to reducing the loan volume. But in an economic downturn, 
capital may be more expensive or even unavailable for weaker institutions. The bank may also 
be concerned about the possible negative signalling effects of tapping the capital market in these 
circumstances. Cutting the loan business may therefore be the preferable option to the bank, 
thus reducing the financing possibilities of firms when they are most needed. In that context, it 
should be noted that a reshuffling of the loan portfolio from more to less risky corporate 
borrowers was not really an option under the old Accord since all such borrowers were 
weighted at 100%.  
The procyclical effect can also work through the composition of the bank’s own funds. The 
Capital Accord of 1988 provides for the possibility to include certain asset revaluation reserves 
in the supplementary, so-called ‘tier 2’ capital. Such revaluation can arise either in the form of a 
formal revaluation of banks’ own premises or in the form of ‘latent’ revaluation reserves, which 
result from the practice of holding securities at historical cost. The Basel Committee accepted 
that these latent reserves could be included in the capital basis after a discount. In an economic 
upturn, when asset prices generally soar, the revaluations would therefore increase banks’ 
lending potential and the reverse would happen in an economic downturn. This factor may, for 
example, have affected the lending behaviour of Japanese banks, which traditionally hold large 
equity portfolios.  
6.2.2  Under Basel II 
Procyclical concerns have received more attention with the review of the Capital Accord that is 
now underway. The whole debate is also a clear illustration of the growing awareness in the 
supervisory community of the potential macro-impact of micro-prudent regulations. 
A major feature of the New Accord is its increased risk-sensitivity, as inter alia reflected in risk 
weights that better reflect the credit conditions of the counterparty and the wider recognition of BASEL II AND THE FUTURE OF THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL SYSTEM | 53 
 
the risk-reducing effect of collateral. Procyclicality concerns have been especially voiced in the 
context of the internal ratings-based approach (IRB), but to a lesser extent also for the standard 
approach, for which the new Accord provides. Under Basel I there were fewer concerns since 
the debtor’s credit quality did not have an impact on the risk weights used within the broad 
categories of counterparts (e.g. sovereigns, banks and corporates).  
Under the IRB approach, banks use their own estimates of the probability of default (PD). With 
this input, a risk weight can be derived from a supervisory-defined risk weight curve. This 
ultimately determines the own funds that the bank has to set aside for exposures on this 
borrower. It has been argued that banks use so-called ‘point-in-time’ estimates for their PDs, 
meaning that the estimates are usually based on the borrowers’ current conditions and are valid 
for only a short time horizon of one year. This bank practice can be explained by data 
availability, accounting and tax conventions, etc.  
As a result, banks’ PD estimates are very much influenced by the present state of the economy, 
thus making risk weights cyclically sensitive and causing capital requirements to increase in a 
downturn. Banks could therefore face increasing capital needs in periods when capital is most 
costly and may as a result choose to reduce assets or reshuffle their portfolio towards less risky 
debtors, thus deepening the downturn. So if banks do not hold capital buffers on top of the 
minimum regulatory requirements, they may become vulnerable to increasing risks. Holding 
such buffers is already a well-established practice, but under the IRB approach banks could 
need significantly higher buffers than before to avoid the situation in which the minimum 
requirements become binding. 
There is less concern under the standard approach, which is built around external assessments 
provided by rating agencies. Ratings are ‘through-the-cycle’ estimates of credit quality and 
therefore have a longer perspective. The ratings are assigned on the basis of assessed borrower 
performance under a standardised stress scenario. Nevertheless, it has also been noted that in an 
economic upturn the number of rating upgrades is higher than the number of downgrades, and 
the reverse occurs in an economic downturn. Moreover, external ratings have experienced 
significant swings in times of financial crises, such as the Asian crisis of 1998. External ratings 
are therefore not completely free of procyclicality effects. 
Finally, procyclicality can also work through the broader pool of eligible collateral provided for 
under Basel II. Apart from loans secured on residential property, Basel I only granted a lower 
risk weight to loans secured by cash, securities issues by OECD central governments and 
specified multilateral development banks. Under the new Capital Accord, most types of 
financial instruments, including some equities, are recognised as collateral and advanced IRB 
banks have even more flexibility.  
6.3  Possible measures to address concerns 
The Basel Committee is well aware of the potential procyclical effects of its new capital 
framework and has tried to address it in various ways. Further, supervisors and banks may 
already apply techniques to address these concerns. The most frequently used techniques are: 
•  Flattening the risk weight curve. The risk weight curve transforms the PDs into risk weights 
for certain types of exposures. The steeper the curve, the greater the effect of a given change 
in the PD on the risk weight, or the greater the risk sensitivity of the capital framework. This 
may well be justified from a risk-management perspective, but it also increases 
procyclicality. An obvious way to reduce this risk is therefore to flatten the curve, with the 
trade-off that the risk sensitivity also decreases. This technique has been used by the Basel 
Committee to calibrate the capital framework on the basis of the outcome of the quantitative 
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•  Through-the-cycle ratings. Instead of using ‘point-in-time’ estimates of PDs, banks could be 
encouraged to use a longer time horizon in assigning ratings, while at the same time keeping 
the integrity and ‘signalling power’ of their internal risk-management systems. This is 
exactly what the Basel Committee tries to do by requiring that a borrower rating must 
represent the bank’s assessment of the borrower’s ability to perform contractually despite 
adverse economic conditions and unexpected events. The bank can satisfy this requirement, 
either by basing its rating assignments on specific appropriate stress scenarios or by taking 
into account the borrower’s vulnerability to adverse economic conditions without explicitly 
specifying such a stress scenario. Additionally, the historical observation period used to 
estimate the PDs has to be at least five years in principle. There is the risk that when the new 
capital framework is introduced banks may not yet have established sufficiently long data 
series for through-the-cycle estimates, so that at this particular point in time the risk of 
procyclicality could be higher. 
•  Stress-testing. As previously mentioned, stress-testing can be used to adjust PDs for the 
effect of adverse economic conditions. The Basel Committee also requires an IRB bank to 
use stress tests in the assessment of its capital adequacy. The stress test should at least 
consider the effect of mild recession scenarios on the bank’s PDs, LGDs (loss-given 
defaults) and EADs (exposures at default). The tests may result in corrective measures taken 
by the bank, such as a shift in portfolio composition or the building-up of additional capital 
buffers. National supervisors may wish to give guidance to their banks on how such stress 
tests should be designed, bearing in mind conditions in their jurisdictions. The Basel 
Committee may also want to monitor developments in this field and come up with more 
concrete guidance. 
•  Tightening lending standards and loan monitoring in the upswing. It has been argued that 
banks’ risks are the highest at the peak of an economic upturn and only manifest themselves 
subsequently through higher loan provisions and losses. This phenomenon would argue for 
stricter lending standards and a more rigorous supervisory review during the expansive 
phase. One way of doing so is by applying lower ‘loan-to-value’ ratios, a technique that was 
successfully used by the Hong Kong authorities to prevent increasing property prices from 
further fuelling a real estate boom and to safeguard the banking system in the wake of the 
Asian crisis. Other supervisors may not be comfortable with such an approach because of 
‘level playing field’ considerations and concerns about the interference in the individual 
policy of banks that otherwise may be financially sound. Another suggestion is that banks 
and supervisors could adjust the way they monitor loan portfolios. For example, junior loan 
officers and bank inspectors could be more exposed to loan work in the early phase of their 
career, and more seasoned staff could review loans that have not experienced problems over 
a sustained period to identify more subtle indicators of weakness.  
•  Capital requirements that are a function of the state of the economy. Instead of having a 
fixed-solvency standard, the regulatory capital requirements could be made dependent on 
prevailing macroeconomic conditions. Thus in an economic downturn, capital requirements 
would decrease while in an economic upturn they would increase. Nevertheless, if 
supervisors are given too much discretion to adjust the requirements this also carries the risk 
of ex-post regulatory forbearance. It is therefore important to specify ex-ante when such 
adjustments can be made as well as to what extent. Technically, several techniques have 
been proposed to achieve such variable capital requirements, for example by using time-
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ratio. Obviously, the selection of an appropriate metric to accurately assess the state of the 
economy will also be an important factor to the application of this technique.
1 
•  Building up additional capital buffers. By building up capital buffers on top of the 
minimum capital requirements, banks can create more slack in their lending behaviour and 
will therefore be less pressured to reduce loan activity in a downturn. Banks can do this on 
their own initiative or be requested to do so by supervisors under the second pillar. Some 
supervisors, such as the UK’s Financial Services Authority, apply this technique already by 
using a target-solvency ratio in combination with a minimum-solvency ratio. Under this 
regime, the bank is required to meet the target ratio in normal economic conditions, 
however, if general economic conditions require change, a bank can be allowed by the 
supervisor to go under the target as long as the minimum ratio is still met. In a way, the 
dynamic provisioning idea discussed below is another illustration of the build-up of 
additional capital buffers.  
6.4 Dynamic  provisioning 
Dynamic provisioning is based on the underlying idea that from a statistical point of view, a 
bank is certain to incur credit losses from the moment that it originates loans. In order to 
account for this, the bank should be forward-looking and ideally make provisions over the 
whole life of the loan for the losses it expects to incur. The provisions set aside in each 
accounting time period should be based on an estimate of the long-term expected loss as 
supported by statistical data, which is why this provisioning technique is sometimes called 
‘statistical provisioning’. The provision would then build up in any year in which actual losses 
fell short of expected losses (economic upturn), while in years in which the actual losses 
exceeded the expected ones (economic downturn), the provision would be drawn upon. Current 
accounting and tax practices, however, often do not acknowledge the economic reality just 
described and are as a rule backward-looking, only allowing loan provisions and write-downs 
when credit losses have actually occurred or are likely to do so in the near future.  
Some of the major international banks already use dynamic provisioning and a number of 
supervisory authorities have either made such a system compulsory or are considering 
introducing it. Spain was the pioneering country in Europe when it introduced its statistical 
provisioning method in 1999, the motivation being the boom in the Spanish economy at that 
time and the concern that loan-loss provisions were not growing sufficiently to match the 
increased credit risk. Under the Spanish regime, banks can calculate their statistical provision by 
using their own internal models or by using a standard method defined by the supervisor. The 
former is based on the bank’s own data and risk assessment, which poses a challenge for the 
supervisor to verify whether such models measure credit risk properly. The latter divides loans 
into six categories with different risk weights fixed by the supervisor on the basis of historical 
experience. The dynamic provision in Spain is subject to an upper limit; the provision is not tax 
deductible and is not included in the regulatory capital base. Banks are also required to disclose 
information on this provisioning. 
In addition to the fact that it better matches economic reality and provides banks with incentives 
for improved risk-management, dynamic provisioning should lead to lower volatility in banks’ 
profit and loss figures, thus ameliorating concerns about procyclicality. It may further lead to a 
more accurate pricing of credit risk and better calculations for capital requirements. A crucial 
factor in the success of the technique is the reliability of the estimates of expected losses, and in 
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that respect the data challenges are considerable. In practice, it will be difficult to identify the 
economic cycle and to distinguish it from the trend; further, there is the risk that banks may 
want to manipulate estimates for profit-smoothing purposes. The previously mentioned 
accounting and taxation principles also continue to be major obstacles. 
Sometimes, dynamic provisioning is put forward as a more realistic alternative to the use of full 
fair-value accounting in banking. It should be recalled that fair value is the cornerstone of the 
IAS (International Accounting Standards) framework that European-listed companies have to 
comply with from 2005 onwards for the preparation of their consolidated financial statements. 
One of the consequences of a wider application of fair value is that upward as well as downward 
revaluations of financial instruments are reflected directly in banks’ (regulatory) capital, thus 
affecting their lending potential. This impact revisits the procyclicality concerns mentioned 
earlier. 
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Chapter 7 
Implementation of the New Accord in the EU 
Karel Lannoo* 
inancial regulation has become a topical issue in EU policy-making. With the Financial 
Services Action Plan (FSAP), the European Commission managed to re-draft an 
important part of EU financial services regulation, using new procedures and raising 
awareness of the importance of a single financial market for the European economy. The 
implementation of Basel II in EU law was one of the 42 legislative measures of the FSAP. 
Although some 37 of these have been completed at the time of writing, no agreement will be 
reached on the new capital adequacy Directive before 2005 (the target date of the FSAP), which 
is in any case independent of the wishes of the EU Commission.  
7.1  Basel II in EU legislation 
As with the 1988 Accord, Basel II will be implemented in the EU in the form of a directive and 
thus be formally applicable to all EU-licensed banks. It will also be applicable to investment 
firms for their ongoing capital requirements, furthering the objective to maintain a level playing 
field with the trading departments of universal banks. A directive is a legal EU instrument that 
is binding for member states with regard to the results to be achieved, but leaves the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods. It thus needs to be transposed into national law. 
As the 1988 Accord was fairly simple and straightforward, so was EU legislation. The main 
pieces of legislation, as far as banks are concerned, were the own funds (Directive 89/299/EEC) 
and solvency ratio Directives (Directive 89/647/EEC). The former defines the items that can be 
included in the banks’ own funds calculation. It is composed of ‘tier 1’ capital, which is the 
capital of the bank and the disclosed reserves, and ‘tier 2’ capital, being revaluation and 
undisclosed reserves, general provisions and subordinated debt. The solvency ratio sets a 
minimum required ratio of 8% for all EU-licensed credit institutions from 1 January 1993 
onwards. It is measured as the proportion of own funds of the risk-adjusted value of a bank’s 
total assets and certain off-balance-sheet items, as defined in the Basel I Accord.  
Overall, Basel I was well implemented in the EU and did not give rise to much controversy. The 
main problems with Basel I related to the treatment of special banks (cooperatives) in certain 
member states and the weighting of mortgage loans and bonds. With regard to the latter, an 
optional generalisation of the 50% weighting was agreed in 1998, whereas it only applied to 
residential mortgage loans and in certain member states before.
1 
The first complication of the prudential framework arose with the 1993 capital adequacy 
Directive (CAD I, Directive 93/6/EEC), which set minimum capital requirements for investment 
firms. These rules were also applicable to the trading books of universal banks, if these 
institutions choose not to subject their total business to the more demanding solvency ratios 
Directive (SRD). The CAD follows the building block approach for measuring market risk: risk 
in interest rate and equity instruments is added to counterpart and settlement risk to calculate the 
total risk exposure. A further complication arose with the 1998 adaptation to allow for the use of 
more sophisticated internal risk-management models by banks and investment firms, the so-
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called ‘value-at-risk’ models (CAD II, Directive 98/31/EC). This followed the 1996 market risk 
amendment to the Basel Accord. An important feature of the CAD II is that it required the 
results of the institution's own capital requirements calculation to be scaled up by a 
multiplication factor of at least three (Annex 7, §6).  
A first draft of a directive for the transposition of Basel II into EU law, together with the third 
consultation paper, was published by the European Commission in July 2003.
2 The draft 
directive will modify many provisions of Directive 2000/12/EC, which consolidated EU 
banking law in a single text, including the provisions of the own funds, solvency ratio, CAD I 
and CAD II Directives. It will hence continue to be applicable to banks and to the ongoing 
capital requirements of investment firms – the initial capital requirements being set in the 
investment services Directive. In its working document, the Commission stresses the need for a 
flexible framework, to allow updates of the technical aspects “to reflect ongoing market, 
regulatory and supervisory innovation” (p. 7). The Commission has structured the document in 
two parts: the first of these, the Articles, contain the principles and central rules governing the 
issue in question; the second part, the Annexes, contain the more detailed technical 
implementation measures. The Commission Services envisage that the Articles will only be 
amended by co-decision. The provisions contained in the Annexes will be subject to amendment 
by comitology procedure. Unlike the Lamfalussy procedure, however, the full document, 
meaning articles and annexes, will be passed following the co-decision legislative process –
apparently for reasons of accountability. 
Table 7.1 A brief overview of the Basel Accords in EU legislation 
 Number  of  articles  Articles open to 
comitology 
Total word count 
(including recitals and 
annexes) 
Basel I (1989)  10 (own funds 
Directive) 
13 + 3 Annexes 
(solvency ratio 
Directive) 
None 
Definitions and items in 
the classifications 
(annexes) 
3,439 
5,290 
CAD I (1993)  15 + 6 Annexes  None (never 
implemented) 
14,649 
CAD II (1998)  4 + 7 Annexes 
(amending CAD I) 
Idem 7,490 
Basel II or CAD III 
(2003, draft) 
146 + 12 Annexes  Mainly annexes, 
articles not yet 
specified 
ca. 141,000  
67,000 without annexes 
ISD II (2002, draft) (for 
reference) 
67 18  25,556 
 
Table 7.1 above gives a snapshot of the Basel Accord in EU law. It documents how the 
wordiness and complexity of the different directives have grown, and how it is likely to further 
grow through the extensive application of comitology to the CAD III. In the past, comitology 
only applied in a limited way to the own funds and solvency ratio Directives, for which the 
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Banking Advisory Committee (BAC) existed.
3 It did not apply to CAD I and CAD II, since a 
‘pre-Lamfalussy’ Securities Committee could never be constituted owing to the political and 
procedural problems between the European Commission, Council and Parliament.
4 This 
contributed to the creation of the Forum of European Securities Commissions (FESCO) as an 
intergovernmental body (December 1997) and later to the establishment of the Lamfalussy 
Committee, and to a new Committee structure, including the European Securities Committee 
(ESC) and the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR) to replace FESCO. 
7.2  The Lamfalussy Committee structure 
Further to the Council conclusions of 3 December 2002, the European Commission decided on 
6 November 2003 to extend the Lamfalussy approach to banking and insurance.
5 The 
Lamfalussy approach is seen to be successful and adapted to market needs. Concretely, this 
means for banking regulation that legislative measures will be drafted, further to broad 
consultation, by subdividing them into essential elements: principles (level 1) and technical 
implementing measures (level 2). The implementing measures will be adapted using the 
comitology procedure. It requires the creation or adaptation of committees to assist the 
European Commission in its implementation work. In the area of banking, it has led to the 
creation of the European Banking Committee (EBC), to replace the Banking Advisory 
Committee (BAC), and the Committee of European Banking Supervisors (CEBS), to provide 
advice to the European Commission on level 2 implementing measures and to enhance 
cooperation between national supervisory authorities (level 3). 
The Lamfalussy approach has, however, only been in force since February 2002, when it was 
approved by the European Parliament, and the first measures following the new procedure, the 
market abuse (2003/6/EC) and prospectus (2003/71/EC) Directives, have yet to come into 
effect. Implementing measures have only been formally adopted for the market abuse Directive. 
Thus it is still early to judge its effectiveness, and even more so to evaluate other elements of 
the new process, such as the cooperation between supervisors (level 3) and better enforcement 
(level 4). Nevertheless, based on the first two years of experience with the new securities 
markets Directives, some general observations can be made.  
On the positive side, the new approach has significantly increased the cooperation amongst 
supervisory authorities (see Table 7.2). Not only do ministry of finance representatives have to 
sit together when discussing draft directives, supervisors now also meet to discuss implementing 
measures. This should certainly have a positive effect on levelling the regulatory playing field. 
It increases the degree of regulatory harmonisation and reduces the possibility for host-country 
restrictions. At the same time, supervisors are aware that their respective financial centres are 
still in competition with each other and that they need to ensure that regulation is in line with 
market needs. 
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Table 7.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the Lamfalussy procedure 
Strengths Weaknesses 
•  Forces supervisory authorities to cooperate, 
convergence of supervisory practices 
•  Competition among supervisory authorities: 
there is a constructive ambiguity between 
regulatory cooperation and competition 
•  Increases the transparency of the regulatory 
process 
•  Higher degree of regulatory harmonisation 
•  Reduces possibilities for host-country 
restrictions  
•  No clear rule to differentiate between 
framework measures and details 
•  Laborious and complex process 
•  Time-consuming and resource-absorbing 
process for the authorities as well as for the 
private sector 
•  Increases the opportunity for regulatory 
capture 
•  Higher degree of centralisation: the European 
Commission has the final word and the role of 
national supervisory authorities is limited 
(only advisory) 
 
Because of the need for consultation at the different levels of the process, the regulatory 
procedure has also become much more transparent. Financial regulation has become more 
accessible. This has, however, at the same time increased the inherent complexity of the 
process. Owing to the requirement to consult at several stages, the regulatory process has 
become very laborious and complicated. It is both very time consuming and resource absorbing, 
for regulators as well as for the private sector to be involved in all the stages and to remain alert. 
This is especially the case for smaller member states and for small firms. Those who care about 
following the process from the beginning can possibly influence the process the most, although 
it could be argued that this was not visible in the past. A final remark is the danger of too much 
centralisation. The European Commission is, in implementing the measures, free in principle to 
accept or reject what the supervisors propose; it also chairs the comitology Committee. If the 
proposals of the European Convention are accepted, the control of the European Commission 
over implementing measures will be further strengthened, as comitology is formally abolished 
in Art. 35 of the draft treaty.
6 
The former procedure predicts a mixed outlook for the implementation of Basel II in European 
law. More cooperation between banking supervisory authorities, beyond the strategic level, is 
certainly of utmost importance. A harmonious implementation of the Accord should allow for a 
real level playing field in the EU and avoid the distortions that could result from the approach of 
the supervisory review process. The requirement for supervisory authorities to work closely 
together and consult on proposals for the implementation of Articles and Annexes, as is being 
done in the context of the new securities markets Directives, will bring a sea change to the 
limited regulatory and ad-hoc supervisory cooperation in place at present (or on which very 
little is known). It should avoid the danger of conflicting approaches under the supervisory 
review process (the second pillar) and reduce differences that concern whether banks are active 
on a cross-border level in the EU through branches or subsidiaries. It should in the medium term 
lead to a single European rule book for supervisory authorities and allow banks to come to a 
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single form of supervisory reporting.
7 It would thus create ‘economies’ for both supervisors and 
banks: supervisors would be better informed about banks active in different jurisdictions and 
banks could integrate supervisory reporting requirements.  
On the more critical side, two major points emerge. The implementation of the Basel II 
framework in EU law will further increase the complexity of the process. What was already 
laborious and heavy in the Basel framework, will become even more so in EU implementation. 
It suffices to look at the first pieces of EU law following the Lamfalussy approach, such as the 
market abuse, the prospectus or the investment services Directives. The latter Directive, in its 
coverage of level 1, was already double of the size of the previous Directive and risks becoming 
even more complex following the adoption of the implementing measures by the European 
Securities Committee. If the European Commission sends the CAD III in its entirety through the 
co-decision procedure, the risk is not imaginary that some, albeit minor technical items, will be 
further changed as a result of intensive lobbying of some pressure groups. 
A second point is the rather elaborate committee structure and the possible overlap of 
competences. The CAD III deals with banks and investment firms, meaning that both the 
banking and securities committees are in charge of dealing with the implementing measures. A 
clear division of tasks will thus be needed. A related issue is that comitology has a different role 
in banking than it has in securities markets. Cooperation between regulators has, by tradition, 
been more developed in banking than in securities markets, in the Basel Committee and the 
1972 Contact Committee for example. Banking regulation is by definition more specific and 
less ‘soft’ than code of conduct rules for brokers. In the past, supervisory cooperation in 
banking had a more ad-hoc nature and related to particular cases of a bank active in different 
jurisdictions. In the context of the Basel implementation, supervisors will need to demonstrate 
that they can make a quantum leap towards a much more elaborate form of cooperation.  
All the experiences with the Lamfalussy Committee are so far based on an EU with 15 member 
states. With the accession of ten new member states formally coming into force on 1 May 2004, 
debates on financial regulation will change somewhat. The accession countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe have a less-developed banking market and a less elaborate structure of financial 
supervision. Although their banking markets are largely foreign-controlled, most banks are 
separately incorporated as subsidiaries or separate entities and thus locally supervised. The 
Polish banking supervisor has already indicated that they will only apply the standardised 
approach, because of a lack of resources. A single supervisor reporting in the EU is thus not 
immediately on the books, at least in its enlarged dimension. 
7.3  Interaction between EU and global implementation 
Back in 1989, when the single market was under construction, a reciprocity provision in the key 
financial services directives caused uproar in some non-EU countries. It was argued that the EU 
was becoming a fortress, since access to the EU market would only be granted to non-EU 
institutions provided they give comparable access to their market. Some 15 years later, it seems 
that comparable access in the implementation of the Basel Accord is hindering European banks 
in the other direction. EU-based banks will have the full set of options for implementing the 
Basel Accord, depending on their preferences and capacities, but in other countries they will be 
subject to national treatment or worse, subject to the discretion of local supervisors. This will 
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not only create a competitive distortion for EU banks active in non-EU countries, it will also 
hamper integrated risk-management and supervisory reporting within these groups, with all the 
negative consequences this may entail. 
The US position of applying only the advanced internal ratings-based approach of the new Basel 
Accord to some 20 internationally active banks and to apply Basel I to all the other banks, is 
distorting the level playing field for EU banks in the US market. The justification that 
internationally active banks control 99% of the foreign assets (in the assets held) in the US 
banking system does not take into account the significant stake of EU banks in the US banking 
system.
8 It will distort competition and prevent EU banks from applying a single risk-
management model, and thus may also have negative implications for global systemic stability 
as well. As it also creates distortions between the two tiers of US banks, however, it is likely 
that a solution will emerge from inside the US. Nevertheless, it may be useful if the EU Council 
of Finance Ministers discussed this matter and proposed some action, as was done in the context 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.
9  
Another asymmetry with the US implementation, i.e. the application of Basel II to investment 
firms in the EU, seems to be nearing a more integrated approach further to the draft Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) rules concerning supervision of broker-dealers on a 
consolidated basis.
10 This would imply that capital charges for broker-dealers that are part of a 
holding company are calculated on a net basis. They would also be allowed to use internal 
models for these calculations, following the Basel proposals. This consolidated supervision 
would also apply to investment bank holding companies. This move was warmly welcomed by 
the European Commission.
11 But, it is uncertain at this stage how ‘equivalent’ the US approach 
will be. 
The need for consistency in the application of the different approaches applies not only in an 
EU-US context, but also globally. Home and host-country supervisory authorities need to 
cooperate closely to ensure an integrated application of the new Basel framework. Supervisory 
authorities in developing countries may lack the skills to apply the IRB approaches to third-
country banks active in their territory or may prefer not to do it for competitive or market-
structure reasons. Different approaches in countries with largely unsophisticated banks may 
leave the latter with the lower quality loans. Cross-border implementation has been addressed 
by Basel’s Accord Implementation Group (AIG), but its principles leave host-country 
authorities to impose national treatment, duplicating reporting requirements.
12  
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The problems with the global acceptance of the Accord raise the issue of the how representative 
the Basel Committee is. A more balanced representation of countries, reflecting the importance 
of the global banking system, would enhance the credibility and effectiveness of the Basel 
Committee. EU member states, which today account for nine out of the 13 members of the 
Committee, could take a step in this direction by proposing reform to their representation, to 
reflect the growing importance of the EU in financial regulation – and at the same time come to 
a more balanced representation of the Committee by including representatives of supervisors 
from some larger emerging countries. This would enable the Committee to meet its original 
ambition of global financial stability. We would, however, not argue for a change towards a 
more formally appointed body, as this would reduce its effectiveness. 
7.4  Interaction with the move to international accounting standards 
The problems raised by the interaction between accounting and prudential rules have only 
recently started to emerge on the policy agenda. The international accounting standards (IAS) 
regulation was formally adopted by the EU in July 2002. It requires EU-listed companies and 
issues on EU capital markets to prepare consolidated accounts in accordance with the IAS from 
2005 onwards or to explain the equivalence of domestic rules with those of the IAS. By the end 
of 2002, only some 275 EU-listed companies were applying the IAS. The goal is to increase this 
number to encompass the estimated 6,000 EU-listed companies by 2005 – an enormous shift in 
itself.  
The IAS regulation empowers the European Commission, assisted by the Accounting 
Regulatory Committee, to decide on the applicability of the IAS. It states that the IAS can only 
be adopted if the standards are conducive to the European public good and if they meet the 
criteria of clarity, relevance, reliability and comparability of financial information. Each adopted 
standard will be published as a Commission regulation (Art. 3). So far, the EU has agreed to the 
adoption of all standards (on 16 July 2003) with the exception of IAS 32 and 39, the crucial 
standards for the financial services industry. 
The core difficulty with IAS for financial institutions is the fair-value principle. Although the 
application of this principle is limited so far for banking groups, it remains an option in the 
latest exposure draft of IAS 39, implying that the IAS Board (IASB) is pursuing the extension 
of fair valuation in the medium term to all financial institutions. This increases the volatility of a 
bank’s balance sheet and raises the problem of differences between the own funds definition 
used by accountants and regulators. Seen in combination with the increased cyclicality of the 
internal ratings-based approach of Basel II, the application of fair value would further aggravate 
cyclical effects and lead to increased disintermediation. Banks would be less inclined to 
transform short-term savings into long-term investments and an essential element of the bank-
based financial system would disappear.
13 
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Chapter 8 
Getting the Best out of Basel II 
for the European Banking System
 
David G. Mayes* 
he extended consultation and assessment process for Basel II has been valuable, not just 
because it has been possible to improve considerably upon the original proposals, but 
also because it has highlighted a set of issues that banks and regulators alike have to 
tackle over the coming years. Some of these can be addressed in the way that the EU and 
individual countries decide to implement the Accord and develop new regulations and 
supervisory practices, but other issues need to be considered as part of the wide-ranging review 
of the regulations of the single market for financial services. 
This chapter of the Task Force Report considers just four issues: 
•  the concept of a level playing field and the wish to ensure fair competition both among 
financial institutions and their customers; 
•  the need to manage the scope for supervisory discretion under the second pillar; 
•  the need to improve coordination among the authorities to handle complex multinational 
financial institutions; and 
•  the need to go beyond the basic disclosure requirements in the third pillar to enable market 
discipline to operate effectively. This implies two main areas for action in addition to the 
quality and relevance of the material to be disclosed, namely, 
o  improvements in corporate governance to ensure that market signals are not merely 
observed but acted upon; and 
o  an effective and predictable set of procedures for handling weak or problem banks, so 
that those that are solvent but under-capitalised are swiftly returned to adequate 
capitalisation and those that are insolvent are immediately exited without the need for 
taxpayer funds, irregardless of their size. 
This last issue takes us full circle, for if these conditions are not met, banks that are permitted to 
operate below the Basel limits or are thought likely to be subject to forbearance or bailout will 
have not just a comparative advantage but will be open to moral hazard and greater risk-taking, 
thus contradicting the primary objectives of the Accord. The three pillars need to work together 
in supporting the system. 
8.1  Implementing Basel II 
In implementing Basel II, authorities around the world will be seeking to ensure compliance 
with the minimum prudential standards and to give their banks encouragement to become 
sufficiently well managed so that they can employ more advanced risk-management methods 
and hence reduce their capital charges. In that way, efficient international banks will be able to 
gain a competitive advantage. The US decision to apply Basel II just to the ten or so largest 
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institutions and to permit around ten other banks who can demonstrate the need and ability to 
join them if they choose (Ferguson, 2003) illustrates this point very clearly. The Accord is 
supposed to represent not just good risk-management practice but the highest standards of 
supervisory practice as well. The US regards itself as following the best supervisory practice at 
present. Hence enacting Basel II generally would achieve nothing, as the standardised features 
of the first pillar, the requirements of the second and third pillars are already effectively being 
applied. It is only where Basel II offers a reduction in capital charges for US banks that adoption 
is worthwhile. 
The position in the European Union/European Economic Area is (EU/EEA) not the same. 
Current supervisory practices are not at present universally compliant with the second pillar or 
with the disclosure requirements of the third pillar. Applying Basel II generally would imply a 
widespread increase in risk-management and supervisory performance. Hence the Commission 
has decided on a general application. Is this going to be to the disadvantage of EU/EEA banks, 
their customers and general welfare? This question leads us directly to our points below. 
8.1.1  Ensuring a level playing field and fair competition 
In choosing how to regulate that part of international services that falls within a particular 
jurisdiction, attention must be paid to the regulatory choices of other international participants. 
Sub-optimal regulation is likely to drive business away rather than have it more prudently run. 
This is not a case of a rush for the bottom, as customers are seeking a greater guarantee of good 
risk-management practice. Outside some areas of operational risk, Basel II rewards better risk-
management, so incentives are quite well-aligned. Both insufficient and excess regulation will 
be penalised. It suffices to consider the position of the Japanese international banks, for 
example. 
Because of their generally smaller size and greater internationalisation (given that the euro is not 
taken as defining a border) a considerably larger number of banks in Europe will be able to 
benefit from applying the more advanced approaches. Indeed, the European Commission 
(2003e) in its assessment of the third quantitative impact study (QIS-3) suggests that these gains 
will accrue to most banks given the different risk weights for various assets. This benefit is 
anticipated even without considering those of improved management and monitoring systems. 
There is, however, a danger in believing that the only way to have fair competition is for all 
financial institutions to be subject to the same regulation. It has already been noted that the 
application of the same capital charge procedures to firms covered by the investment services 
Directive will place EU/EEA investment firms at a disadvantage compared with their US 
counterparts (Calomiris & Herring, 2003). Factors other than regulation give different 
institutional forms different advantages. The systemic issues that make banks ‘special’ and 
justify extra regulation to protect the wider society do not necessarily apply to fund 
management. 
Similar concerns have been expressed by other non-deposit-taking companies in specialised 
areas such as leasing, where exposures are limited, given collateral and insurance (Leaseurope, 
2003). These issues apply more widely to the EU approach to financial regulation (see 
Alexander, 2003) on the subject of securities markets) and do not relate specifically to banks, 
which is the subject of Basel II. Thus rather than extend this blanket approach, which may 
inhibit the provision of narrower services to customers and hence increase their costs, it might 
make more sense to reconsider the general principle. It is not, after all, a requirement of large 
‘federal’ areas, as the US illustrates. Banks are being given the option of choosing the regime 
(Ferguson, 2003). Different classes of financial institutions face different systemic risks and 
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8.2  The second pillar 
The implementation of the second pillar provides one of the biggest challenges because this 
section is based on principles. There is no accepted way to approach it and supervisors can be 
expected to follow quite different paths. It is not at all clear in advance how supervisors will 
conduct the review or how comparable it will be across the various jurisdictions in the EU/EEA. 
It ought to assist the risk-management of banks in two respects, first by offering a second 
opinion on what is being done. Since supervisors could add further capital requirements if 
systems are inadequate or risks are not captured fully by the procedures under the first pillar, 
there are incentives for improvement. Nevertheless, there could also be incentives for ‘regime 
shopping’ if supervisors react differently to the same information. While the Finnish 
Supervisory Authority is deliberately trying to make the process open and predictable so that 
banks can minimise their costs of preparation and can have some basis for action against the 
authority if it appears not have been fair, it is unclear at this point what the general approach is 
going to be. 
It may be sensible to carefully analyse how the quality of the supervisory process will be 
assessed. The CAMELS ratings in the US are not disclosed. It is not clear whether the 
supervisory assessment or any requirement for further capital will be disclosed in the European 
environment. Yet doing so would produce strong incentives for good risk-management and 
good supervisory processes. 
8.2.1  Coordination issues among European authorities 
Consolidated supervision is difficult for complex international banks as information has to be 
put together from a variety of supervisors and jurisdictions. It will be particularly confusing if 
supervisory reviews are confidential in some countries and the results published in others. It will 
also be difficult for the lead supervisor to add up the discretionary decisions of the various host-
country authorities if there is not some modicum of uniformity and communality of reporting 
the results. This need for consistency could lead to more pressure towards the EU/EEA-level of 
regulation of such multinational groups or at least to some means of achieving greater 
compatibility with the systems of the lead regulator. This strategy later may be an easier way 
forward as it permits the development of regional supervisory relationships that reflect the 
structures of the largest banks that are supervised. The Nordic supervisors have had to organise 
the supervision of their largest banks among themselves irrelevant of any outside pressures. 
Some clear thought on how the coordination of the second pillar is to be achieved is needed at 
minimum.  
Some of these cross-border issues are being addressed by the Basel Committee's Accord 
Implementation Group (AIG) (Basel Committee, 2003e). Nevertheless it remains the case at 
present that supervisors in different jurisdictions could permit different levels of sophistication 
of modelling methods among the parts of a cross-border banking group. Brouwer et al. (2003) 
emphasise that it will require far more than simple case-by-case memoranda of understanding if 
the European supervisory authorities are to be able to present an efficient framework to complex 
cross-border banks and offer a plausible programme of action in the event of difficulty. 
8.3  Ensuring market discipline – going beyond the third pillar 
The third pillar of the draft Accord is very much the least regarded, yet if the Accord is to work 
as intended all three pillars need to support the structure. While comparisons of the number of 
pages in the draft on each pillar may be a little simplistic (Rochet, 2003) they make a clear 
point. The pages on the third pillar are little more than a list of the type of information that 
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how it may work. Disclosure is indeed an essential ingredient to functioning market-discipline 
but it by no means ensures it. Market discipline can operate when those who have a stake in a 
bank, whether as customers, creditors, owners, employees, etc., can act on the basis of the 
information they have, through observable movements in prices or quantities to impel bank 
managements to improve their risk management. 
There are thus three essential steps in this process: 
•  stakeholders have to have adequate information on what is going on at the bank; 
•  they have to be able to react to that knowledge in some kind of market, be it the product, 
labour, debt, equity or other markets; and 
•  that reaction needs to be observable and management must respond. 
There are many examples of where these three steps do not apply at present in Europe. Where 
they do not, the Accord will be weakened. Some banks do not need to seek an equity listing and 
do not need to make active use of bond markets for funds. Mutual organisations offer a well-
known source of difficulty, as it is not at all clear how one would change the management of an 
organisation with a highly dispersed ownership.  
The essential word at the outset is the stakeholder. If there is to be any effective action in the 
markets people must have something at stake – they must expect to suffer loss if risk is badly 
managed. This is obvious for groups such as shareholders, directors, depositors and employees 
but it will extend more widely to rating and supervisory agencies as well as borrowers. A rating 
agency will not wish to see its reputation dented by failing to pick up a change in the quality of 
a bank. Similarly, supervisors will be held to account if there are lapses in their monitoring 
systems and hence they may be among the keenest to see action by management in response. 
Indeed they may be one of the few groups with the power to compel it. It is also important to 
note that it is both quantities and prices that matter in market signals. If some of the key trading 
teams exit a bank, that is strong sign, as indeed is withdrawal from the subordinated debt 
market.  
Thus in implementation it is essential that the focus goes beyond the need for disclosure of 
‘sufficient, comparable, accurate and relevant’ information, if that disclosure is actually going to 
affect risk management. Even so it is debatable how relevant the information currently planned 
for disclosure is going to be. If it is released every six months, with a lag, unaudited and with 
only average values for exposures with little forward-looking information, then it is not clear 
what its value will be. The emphasis on explaining how risk is managed is certainly welcome 
but there seems to be little emphasis on the responsibility of the board for the quality and 
accuracy of the statements. As is also reflected in the provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, it is 
essential to get the board to sign off on the information and to be liable for its content. 
Independent non-executive directors play a key role in this regard as they will want to be very 
well informed about the way processes are actually applied before they are prepared to attest to 
them. 
Indeed it would be helpful to look at the experiences of New Zealand, which has been operating 
a disclosure regime since 1996. There the incentive for ensuring high quality information is 
strong, as directors can be imprisoned for up to three years for false statements and are civilly 
liable for losses made as a consequence. Disclosures are quarterly, audited six-monthly and 
include peak exposures so observers can see how often things have gone wrong and the effects 
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8.3.1 Corporate  governance 
Corporate governance issues lie at the heart of effective market discipline. The structure of the 
banking group needs to be such that there can be some knowledge of and influence on its 
banking operations through the market. It has already been noticed in the US for example that 
requirements to issue subordinated debt are not going to be very effective if the holding group is 
the issuer, thus binding up the bank's risks with those of all the other parts of the group. 
Similarly the bank may have no effective equity market. If there are strong cross-holdings and 
inter-relationships, the feed-through to individual responsibility for risk management can be 
weak. The board may be too distant from the management of the banking operations for control 
to be effective.  
The same may be true if there is no effective market for corporate control. In the main it is 
difficult for anyone other than another bank to acquire a bank. It is difficult for others to pass 
the tests of being ‘fit and proper persons’, especially if transactions have to be undertaken 
quickly in the face of difficulty. There is a tendency in European countries for supervisors to 
deal with managements and to try to impose discipline directly, rather than dealing with boards 
and allowing the normal processes of corporate discipline. 
The great advantage of market discipline is that it is continuous and does not require infraction 
of any rule or capital limit for it to be triggered. A bank that is simply under-performing can be 
the source of takeover pressure, as was the case of National Westminster and Midland in the 
UK. Supervisory intervention may only come when it is too late – the unexpected realised and 
the capital lacking. Even rating agencies tend to be lagging indicators, following market signals 
rather than being their initiators. 
8.3.2  Prompt corrective action and exit 
For Basel II to be really effective there needs to be a network of incentives for banks not merely 
to run themselves prudently but to continue to improve their risk-management methods. While 
there are incentives for the largest banks in terms of being able to move to the more advanced 
approaches and reduce their required capital charges, similar pressures need to apply to all 
banks, particularly the weaker ones. The explicit treatment of weak banks by the Basel 
Committee (2002b) focuses on actions that the authorities can take once a bank has become 
under-capitalised or indeed insolvent. Yet the more effective incentive comes from the 
mandatory imposition of unpleasant regulatory actions should a bank find itself in difficulty. 
Such rules for action are intended to be primarily deterrent in character and only rarely applied. 
Nevertheless, for the rules to be credible banks need to be certain that they will be enforced, 
whatever the circumstances or size of the bank. 
As things stand in many of the EU/EEA countries at present, such strong enforcement 
mechanisms seem unlikely for a variety of reasons; hence, Basel II may lose its punch. First, in 
some countries, there is a history of recent bailouts, as in the Nordic countries or France for 
example. Second, few administrations have in place a comprehensive system of prompt 
corrective action as in the US. Thus the role of the authorities in the event of current or 
imminent trouble is difficult to predict and not carefully prescribed. In some cases this is 
cloaked in the idea of ‘constructive ambiguity’. It is argued that if the nature or indeed the 
existence of public sector support is unclear, banks will act as if it is not available. Yet it is 
much more likely that precisely the opposite will occur in such circumstances and banks will 
think that they can make a special case should they ever fall into unfortunate circumstances. 
Such ambiguity is thus anything but constructive and will generate the sorts of moral hazard and 
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A further and more worrying reason for a lack of belief in European authorities' willingness to 
take firm action is that they lack the ability where banks run across a wide range of jurisdictions. 
In the first place it is by no means clear that the memoranda of understanding and other 
information-sharing arrangements necessarily provide the material required to anticipate 
difficulties or to act swiftly should such difficulties occur. The time at which cooperation among 
the authorities is most important is when the problems are incipient and the confidential 
information has the greatest value. When the problem is known, market prices will already have 
moved firmly against those in difficulty and recapitalisation will be noticeably more expensive. 
If regulatory intervention is restricted to that period then there will be incentives for forbearance 
as market solutions are more difficult to achieve. 
But even if the various authorities can cooperate they face serious unresolved difficulties over 
how any support is to be provided, as the authorities in the country of the lead supervisor may 
be very reluctant to provide funds for creditors in other jurisdictions. Only the Swiss authorities 
seem to have tackled this issue (Hüpkes, 2003) and limited the extent to which the insurance 
fund can pay out – a measure clearly aimed at the degree of their exposure to Credit Suisse and 
UBS. In this case the authorities cannot afford to bail out such large banks – they are too big to 
save rather than too big to fail. The same logic can, however, be extended to the other banks in 
the system. No bank is really too big to save if its problems can be detected early enough and 
can be resolved in a manner where it does not stop trading. An obvious approach is to follow the 
US example: give the authorities the power to takeover a bank that is economically insolvent, 
wipe out the existing shareholders and write down the loans, respecting the order of priority, up 
to the point that the bank becomes solvent again (Mayes et al., 2001). 
If the system is incomplete and Basel II is not backed up by prompt corrective action for weak 
banks and a robust exit policy for those that are unlucky enough to become insolvent, then the 
pressures from the three pillars will be noticeably weakened. In particular, banks thought likely 
to be bailed out will face a lower cost of funds than their unprotected rivals, thus tilting the 
playing field. 
8.4 Conclusion 
The new Basel Accord offers an important opportunity to improve the quality of risk 
management and banking supervision in the EU/EEA. If implemented effectively, it is also 
likely to reduce the capital charge for many banks as a result. The full gains will only be 
realised, however, if all three pillars are able to operate effectively together in a wider 
framework of financial regulation. The third pillar in particular could easily be ineffective and 
the second pillar confusing in the face of a variety of interpretations and implementations. The 
Basel framework is likely to prove beneficial, nevertheless, if part of a more complete system of 
oversight, as in the US. Indeed it is instructive that the US authorities only see the need to 
implement Basel II where there is a source of gain for their largest international banks. 
Wholesale implementation across the more fragmented regulatory environment of the EU/EEA 
could impose costs rather than net benefits on banks, thereby incurring competitive losses in 
internationally tradable areas such as investment banking. 
Without a matching effort on the coordination of supervision, the establishment of effective 
valuation standards, the development of prompt corrective action and effective means of bank 
exit, the incentives for better risk management by banks will be weakened. Supporting action in 
implementing all three pillars is thus merited within the EU/EEA. While it would be possible to 
produce a long list of possible measures this chapter highlights just six: 
•  The EU/EEA is implementing Basel II in an internationally competitive banking 
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management by banks, it is intended to reward the best standards by compensating 
reductions in the capital charge. Permitting some choice of regime may enable banks to find 
the most cost-effective framework for good risk management. 
•  The quantitative impact and other studies have revealed the extent to which the banking 
system has procyclical tendencies. While the new Accord should not add to them, it should 
make sure the risks are clearly revealed and emphasise the need to manage them.  
•  The implementation of the new Accord needs to measure the changes in valuations clearly 
and encourage management techniques and supervisory rules, particularly in areas that 
encourage prudent responses such as provisioning, rather than hiding the volatility and 
hence increasing the extent of surprises. A forward-looking approach to the management of 
economic capital needs to dovetail with the inherently backward-looking accounting 
treatment. 
•  The second pillar greatly increases the role of supervisors, but in the fragmented 
environment of the EU/EEA, the discretion entailed from having general principles could 
increase the cost and complexity of regulation. Considerable progress is required not just in 
coordination among supervisors but in improving the transparency of what supervisors 
require and treating individual cross-border banks in a coherent manner. 
•  Europe will need to take the lead in addressing the treatment of cross-border, complex 
financial institutions as their relative importance is much greater than in the US, which will 
seek to impose its own rules on the institutions within its boundaries. 
•  Finally, the third pillar is likely to be muted in the EU/EEA unless there are improvements 
in the framework of corporate governance, which not only allows price and quantity signals 
to emerge but ensures that the stakeholders in the bank can actually force change. Unless 
the third pillar is supported by a viable regime of prompt corrective action for weak banks 
and swift exit for economically insolvent banks, the incentives to better risk management in 
Basel II will easily be undermined by moral hazard. 
  
| 71 
Concluding Remarks 
he New Basel Capital Accord will undoubtedly have a deep impact on the European 
financial system. It should strengthen the resilience of the financial system by bringing 
regulatory capital much closer to economic capital and wipe out the distortions of the 
weightings in the 1988 Basel Accord. It has already set in motion a process of rationalising and 
streamlining the credit-risk assessment procedures in European banking and should lead to a 
much better calibration of risk. It will force small- and medium-sized enterprises to manage 
their finances much better. In this sense it should contribute to improving the general shape of 
the European financial system. 
The fact that Europe will occupy a rather ‘lonely’ position in the implementation of the Accord 
should not be seen as a disadvantage. On the contrary, it is a worthy challenge to render the 
European banking system more sound. US authorities are right in pointing out that the US 
banking system is far better capitalised than the one in Europe. On average, the European 
banking system has a ratio of 6% capital to assets, as compared to 9% in the US (2002).
1 When 
viewed in connection with the higher degree of bank dependence, an increase in overall 
capitalisation levels can be welcomed from a financial stability perspective. To ensure this 
happens, however, a strict and harmonised implementation of the Accord is important. A lax 
transposition of the Accord in EU member countries will not improve the competitiveness of the 
European banking system. Hence it could be argued that the Basel II process is only starting in 
the EU. The capital adequacy Directive (CAD III) process and technical advice on 
implementing measures by the Committee of European Banking Supervisors will need to be 
monitored carefully to allow the benefits to materialise. 
Unlike the 1988 Accord, the New Basel Accord has become part of an evolutionary process in 
banking supervision where risk calibration will be adapted to take into account the progress in 
banking and risk-management techniques. The new European regulatory framework is adapted 
to this and should allow for the emergence in the medium term of a European rule book for 
banks. Reflecting the growing importance of EU financial regulatory matters, a logical 
consequence would be to reform the composition of the Basel Committee. Such reform would at 
the same time be an opportunity to come to a more balanced representation of the major banking 
markets. This would further strengthen the authority of the Committee in the coming decades, 
which is likely to see fairly significant shifts in the economic importance of nations and regions. 
                                                      
1 International Monetary Fund (2004), Global Financial Stability Report, IMF, Washington, D.C. 
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